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1 Introduction
A common thread that runs throughout all discussions of the Chameleon architecture is the notion of 
flexibility. By having a flexible architecture, we allow the basic services and service providers of the 
SIFT layer to change over time. Being that Chameleon offers its fault tolerance services through 
ARMORS, our notion of flexibility essentially extends to having a flexible ARMOR architecture.
Since fault tolerance requirements may change from mission to mission, we allow the specific ARMORS 
that you use and the configuration of these ARMORS to change from mission to mission as well. For 
example, in one mission, you may choose to have the Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM) run in a primary- 
backup configuration, while in another mission, you may choose to have the FTM triplicated; in others, 
you may choose to distribute much of the FTM functionality among several surrogate managers. 
Fundamentally, we strive to give you the flexibility to compose ARMORS from the collection of services 
that we provide, tailoring your suite of ARMORS to match the requirements of a given mission. In 
particular, we attempt to avoid situations in which we mandate that one and only one type of ARMOR be 
capable of providing a specific service. Rather, we try to encapsulate the service into modules that may 
be included in virtually any ARMOR .
To help make the task of assigning functionality to ARMORS more manageable, we provide three groups 
of ARMORS that comprise the core functionality of Chameleon needed by any particular set of ARMORS:
• Managers. Managers are ARMORS that can initiate the remote installation of other ARMORS, as well 
as recover from failures in subordinate ARMORS.
• Daemons. D aem ons are ARMORS that are installed on each node in the C ham eleon netw ork. They 
locally-install new  ARMORS, serve as routers for ARMOR-to-ARMOR com m unications, and interact 
w ith the locally -installed  ARMORS (such as detecting a failed ARMOR process and notify ing the failed 
a r m o r ’s m anager).
• Other ARMORS. These ARMORS which are neither managers nor daemons provide other services in 
the Chameleon environment, such as the monitoring of a user application process (Execution 
ARMOR).
Extending the notion of flexibility even further, we not only allow the makeup of ARMORS to change from 
mission to mission, but also allow the ARMORS to dynamically reconfigure themselves during mn-time. 
For example, we would like to allow the FTM to change from simplex to TMR-execution and back to 
simplex during the lifetime of the mission without having to take down the FTM. Reconfigurability could 
also be used to change the way managers recover from failures over time. The reconfigurability features 
also allow new, uploaded functionality to be dynamically incorporated into active ARMORS without 
bringing those ARMORS down.
Since ARMORs are the key components through which much of the functionality and fault-tolerance of 
the Chameleon environment is derived, it is necessary to make the ARMORs, themselves, resilient to 
failures. The second half of the paper introduces a hierarchical approach to error detection in ARMORs. 
A wide range of failures—from benign to malicious—are considered and a framework presented to 
tolerate the whole range of failures using techniques of varying latency, overhead and periodicity of 
invocation. In keeping with the philosophy of flexibility in Chameleon, the different levels of error 
detection may be selectively turned on or off depending on the amount of overhead that can be tolerated 
by the application. Generally, the addition of the fault-tolerance features involves addition of element(s) 
to corresponding ARMORs which respond to certain activation triggers, and which may be switched on 
or off depending upon the application needs.
This paper begins by describing some of the significant features of the reconfigurable and composable 
Chameleon architecture. We follow this section with a general discussion of ARMOR communications, a 
detailed look at some specific ARMORS that have been implemented using the reconfigurable and
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composable architecture, and an overview of some of the extensions that have been made to support MPI 
applications in the Chameleon environment. Finally, we delve into our support for error detection and 
diagnosis at the ARMOR level, and we show how these mechanisms are constructed in a hierarchical 
manner that take advantage of the reconfigurable and composable architecture of Chameleon.
2 Overview of the Chameleon Infrastructure
As mentioned in the introduction, Chameleon provides fault tolerance services to an application through 
the use of ARMORS. Several different kinds of ARMORS exist in the Chameleon system with varying 
behavior. Some are managers that must be capable of installing other ARMORS and recover from failures 
in subordinate ARMORS. Some are daemons that must route messages to other ARMORS. Some are 
Execution ARMORS that oversee an application process and provide a Chameleon interface to the 
application process. And these are just the ARMORS found in the early implementation of Chameleon—as 
the environment matures and becomes more sophisticated, the library of ARMORS will most likely grow to 
be large and feature-rich.
Despite the diversity among ARMORS in the Chameleon environment, a concerted effort has been made to 
standardize some key characteristics of all ARMORS. A few of these characteristics follow:
•  ARMORS should be reusable across several different fault-tolerant execution strategies wherever 
possible. For example, the same Execution ARMORS ideally should be able to work with MPI 
processes, standalone processes, replicated processes, and so on with little customization.
•  ARMORS should be highly m odular, no t only fo r reusability and debugging purposes, but also to 
support the notion o f ARMOR reconfigurability.
Reconfiguring an ARMOR with different behavior obviously 
becomes much easier if most of the ARMOR’S behavior is 
modularized into separate components.
•  ARMORS should interact with each other through message 
passing. Message passing gives us a sufficiently generic 
interface through which existing and future functionality may 
be invoked easily.
To meet these requirements, we have devised a hierarchical 
ARMOR architecture that provides a framework for implementing 
ARMOR behavior. Under this architecture, messages are 
processed by replaceable objects called elements. Elements form 
the foundation for more complex components including 
compounds and, ultimately, ARMORS. This section presents a 
high-level overview of the Chameleon infrastructure, including 
the hierarchical composition of ARMORS and ARMOR 
communications.
2.1 Hierarchical Composition: A  B asis  for Reconfigurability
The key components in the ARMOR architecture can be represented in the object-oriented class hierarchy 
found in Figure 1. Note that e le m e n t_ t  is the root of the entire class structure. This is important, 
because all Chameleon components share the same interface— namely the interface of an element. The 
derived classes in Figure 1 can be viewed as simply being specialized elements.
Simple elements (instances of the e l e m e n t _ t  class) are the most basic building blocks in the ARMOR 
architecture. The primary responsibility of an element is to process specific messages—different types of 
elements process different types of messages. Several elements may be grouped together to form 
compounds. In fact, a compound groups together objects of any class derived from e l e m e n t _ t ,  so a 
compound may be made up of simple elements, other compounds, or even entire ARMORS. It is the 
potential nested nature of compounds that give Chameleon ARMORS their hierarchical composition.
e le m e n t t ]
com pound_t I
a rm o r t 1
nondaem on_t | daem on_ t
daem on 1 rt 0 1 rt
Figure 1: Class hierarchy for the 
ARMOR architecture
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An instance of the a rm o r_ t  class is a special type of compound that may be executed as a separate 
process and that may send and receive messages to other ARMORS. The other remaining classes in Figure 
1 are specific kinds of ARMORS and will be discussed in later sections.
Operational elements in the Chameleon environment cannot exist in isolation—they must be part of an 
a r a i o r _ t  object in order to be “executing” (i.e., capable of processing messages). When an element is 
created, it is created as part of an existing compound. For typical ARMORS consisting of a single-level 
composition hierarchy, the a r m o r _ t  object serves as the sole compound in the ARMOR. This setup is 
depicted in Figure 2(a). A multi-level composition hierarchy—one where an a r m o r _ t  object is made up 
of one or more compounds—is shown in Figure2(b). Because an element (be it an instance of 
e l e m e n t _ t  or c o m p o u n d _ t)  must be created as part of a parent compound, the outermost a r m o r _ t  
“shell” is usually created first and then populated with its constituent elements. It so happens that the 
constituent elements can completely specify the ARMOR’S behavior, thus giving a convenient form for 
specifying ARMOR behavior.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Typical single-level composition of an ARMOR; (b) Multi-level composition using a
combination of compounds and elements
Now we have the fundamental concept of having ARMORS that are composed of one or more basic 
building blocks. You will recall that another design goal of Chameleon is to allow an ARMOR’S 
composition to dynamically change at run-time. Most of the issues that concern this reconfigurability 
property can be found at the com pound_t level of the class hierarchy. Simply put, a compound has 
ultimate responsibility over its constituent elements, and an element can only be accessed through its 
parent compound. With this in mind, a compound has two primary responsibilities:
1. Manage its composition through the insertion and removal of constituent elements.
2. Deliver incoming messages to one or more of its constituent elements.
To support dynamic reconfigurability, a compound must coordinate all composition changes so that its 
elements are not removed or changed while being used. Requiring that all element interactions be done 
through the parent compound ensures that this condition holds. In fact, the level of indirection that 
compounds provide to their elements is a fundamental concept in the overall ARMOR architecture:
Elements within a compound cannot directly access other elements, even within the same 
compound. All access must be through the parent compound. Since all functionality is 
accessed indirectly, the underlying behavior (element composition) of the ARMOR may be 
dynamically changed without affecting other elements.
This concept also has another ramification for the local ARMOR and remote ARMORS alike—a uniform 
interface to an ARMOR’S functionality. Specifically, the ARMOR architecture forces that most (if not all) of 
the ARMOR’S behavior be accessible through message passing. The reason for having a message passing 
interface for use by remote ARMORS should be fairly obvious. But the fact that elements within the same 
ARMOR cannot directly interact with each other mandates that a similar interface be provided for intra- 
ARMOR behavior invocation. We will see later that these intra-ARMOR messages simply amount to an
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indirect function call; nevertheless, the im portant point to take away from  th is discussion is that 
m essaging provides a universal interface to functionality w ithin the ARMOR and to functionality residing 
in rem ote ARMORS.
2.2 Message Subscription and Delivery
All of this reliance on messaging leads us to the second primary responsibility of compounds—message 
delivery. When elements are added to a compound, the elements typically subscribe to the message types 
that they want to process. Then, when the parent compound receives an incoming message, it consults its 
subscription list to forward the message to the appropriate elements. Forwarding to an arbitrary element 
is possible because all instances of e le m e n t_ t  (and derived classes) have a virtual 
p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function that may be overridden to give an element the ability to process 
specific message types.
But how does the com pound_t object receive the incoming message to deliver to its constituent 
elements? Since a compound is a derived type of e le m e n t_ t ,  it also has a p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () of 
its own. So, messages are delivered to compounds just like any other element—from the parent 
compound. In Figure2(b), for example, the middle-level compound has messages delivered to it by the 
parent a rm o r_ t  object. Note for this to work, all subscription requests are propagated up the parental 
chain. If Element 1 subscribes to message types M l and M2, Element 2 subscribes to M3, Element 4 
subscribes to M4, and Element M5 subscribes to M5, then Table 1 lists the subscription lists for each 
compound.
Table 1: Example subscription list for Figure 2(b)
ELEMENT SUBSCRIPTION LIST
Compound A
M l —> Element 1 
M2 —» Element 1 
M3 -» Element 2
Compound B M4 -» Element 4
ARMOR
M l —» Compound A 
M2 —» Compound A 
M3 Compound A 
M4 -» Compound B 
M5 —» Element 5
Now we just have to worry about how the top-level a rm o r_ t  object receives messages—once the 
a rm o r_ t  gets a message, it simply propagates the message down the composition hierarchy. Messages 
arrive at the top-level a rm o r_ t  object either from within the local ARMOR or from a remote ARMOR. In 
both cases, the message is passed to the a r m o r _ t ’s p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function. For intra- 
ARMOR messages, elements directly pass the message to the a rm o r_ t :  :p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () 
function. For messages from remote ARMORS, specialized elements within each ARMOR read incoming 
messages from some sort of interprocess communication channel (e.g., named pipes for ARMORS and 
daemons, TCP/IP sockets for daemons, etc). These same elements then directly pass the message to the 
a r m o r _ t : :p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function. More details about this procedure will follow, but the 
most important observation to take away from this discussion is that the a r m o r _ t : : -
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p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  ()  function is called for both intra- and inter-ARMOR m essages, thus providing a 
centralized location to  handle all incom ing m essages.
2.3 Inter-ARMOR Communications
W e have seen how ARMORS are com posed o f m odular elem ents and how these elem ents process incom ing 
m essages. N ow , w e w ill give a high-level overview  of inter-ARMOR com m unication— specifically, we 
will take a look at the role that daem ons play in the Cham eleon m essage passing system.
A daemon executes on every node in the Chameleon network, and are typically launched at boot time by 
an initialization script. Since a unique daemon executes on each node, the daemon ID number serves as a 
convenient, network-independent way of identifying nodes. Keep this in mind when you encounter 
statements such as “a manager installs an ARMOR on Daemon X ” and “the FTM allocates Daemons X, Y, 
and Z for use in executing an application.”
named pipe
Figure 3: System view of typical ARMOR installations, complete with ARMOR-to- 
daemon and daemon-to-daemon interconnects
As daemons are just special kinds of ARMORS, they are built around the ARMOR architecture presented 
earlier and contain specialized elements that give them daemon-specific functionality. From a messaging 
point of view, these elements make the daemons behave as routers that pass messages back and forth 
between sending and receiving ARMORS.
All non-daemon ARMORS that execute in the Chameleon system are connected to the local daemon 
through a named pipe. Daemons connect to each other through the network as illustrated in Figure 3. At 
the highest level, message routing is conceptually simple. If ARMOR Ai, for example, wants to send a 
message to ARMOR AJ2, then the message will take the path A\ -> Daemon 1 -> Daemon 6 -»  A]2. We 
will now take a closer look at this process, beginning with the steps taken by the sending ARMOR to 
transmit an outgoing message.
2.3.1 a r m o r  and Daemon Interactions
Non-daemon ARMORS take the basic a rm o r_ t  object and add an element that makes them capable of 
sending and receiving messages. This is the only mandatory element for non-daemon ARMORS, and the 
n ondaem on _ t class in Figure 1 automatically adds this element to the basic a rm o r_ t  structure. The 
extra element, np_m gm t_t, oversees all activity associated with the named pipe connecting the ARMOR 
to the local daemon. As Figure 4 illustrates, the np_m gm t_t is the only element within the ARMOR 
directly connected to the named pipe.
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During its initialization, the np_m gm t_t element creates a new thread to monitor the named pipe for 
incoming messages. Upon receiving a message, the element passes the message to the 
a r m o r _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function to initiate the proper message delivery as described 
above.
For sending outgoing messages, other elements within the ARMOR indirectly invoke the message sending 
capabilities of the np_m gm t_t element, thus keeping with the spirit of the ARMOR architecture so that 
the np_m gm t_t element may be replaced with another element in the future (possibly so that another 
form of IPC can be used between the ARMOR and daemon). To initiate a message send, an element calls 
its e le m e n t_ t :  : s e n d _ m e ssa g e  () function. This function simply passes the message to the top- 
level a r m o r _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function for further processing. At this point, the message 
appears to the ARMOR exactly as if it came from the daemon over the named pipe connection.
Figure 4: ARMOR connection to the local daemon
The a rm o r_ t :  :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function first checks to see if the final destination of the 
message is the local ARMOR or a remote ARMOR (remember, source and destinations are specified by 
ARMORS, not by specific elements within the ARMOR). If the message is intended for the local ARMOR, 
then the a r m o r _ t : :p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () passes the message to top-level ARMOR’S 
co m p o u n d _ t: :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function for delivery to the appropriate element(s).
If the message is to be sent to a remote ARMOR, then the a r m o r _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function 
must forward the message to the np_m gm t_ t element (or whatever element interacts with the local 
daemon). You will recall that we must access this element through the message delivery services of the 
compound in order to provide the proper level of indirection and abstraction required by the 
reconfigurable ARMOR architecture. With this in mind, Chameleon mandates that the np_m gm t_t 
element (or equivalent) subscribe to the MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE message type. Now, whenever the 
top-level a rm o r_ t object receives a message destined for another ARMOR (such as when one of 
a r m o r _ t ’s elements sends an outgoing message), the a r m o r _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function 
creates a new message of type MSG_TRANSMIT_MES SAGE and delivers it to the appropriate element 
using the normal message delivery services of the underlying compound. The body of the new 
MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE is simply the original outgoing message.
So, to  summarize, an elem ent passes a m essage to the top-level a r m o r _ t : : p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () 
function through its own e l e m e n t _ t :  : s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ()  function. The ARMOR then delivers the 
m essage to all child elem ents for an intra-ARMOR m essage; otherwise, the ARMOR encapsulates the 
outgoing message in a MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE m essage for delivery to the elem ent responsib le for 
transm itting outgoing m essages.
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Network Other elements Named pipes
Figure 5:'Daemon connections to the locally-installed ARMORS and to other daemons
2.3.2 Daemon-to-Daemon Interactions
Note that all of the routing of local and remote messages occurs at the a rm o r_ t  level, implying that 
these rules apply equally well to daemons and non-daemons alike. Indeed, this is the case. Daemons, 
however, have an additional routing destination to consider. Whereas non-daemons simply forward all 
outgoing messages to the np_m gm t_t element (or equivalent), daemons can either forward outgoing 
messages through one of two channels:
1. Across one of its named-pipe 
connections to a locally-installed 
ARMOR
/  Local \  yes Transmit over
\N o d e ? / named pipe
no dacmon_np_mgmt_t
(MSG_TRANSM1T_MESSAGE_REM0TE)
2. Across the network to a remote 
daemon for further routing.
As you might expect, daemons contain 
two mandatory elements to assist them in this routing task: 
daem on_np_m gm t_ t and daem o n _n et_ m g m t_ t1.
Conceptually, Figure 5 illustrates these elements and their 
external connections in the Chameleon environment. These 
two elements receive messages and forward them to the 
a rm o r_ t  level of the daemon in much the same way that 
the np_m gm t_t element receives and forwards incoming 
messages to the a rm o r_ t  level for non-daemons. The 
daemon elements, however, each have several connections to 
monitor. Presently, each connection has a separate thread 
that monitors for incoming messages. Although inefficient, „
this solution is readily portable to all of the target platforms F,gure lvlessage routing w,tnin a daemon 
for Chameleon. For performance or resource usage concerns, we may develop platform-specific 
optimizations of these two elements in the future.
Having several connections makes the problem of routing outgoing messages a little more difficult, but 
we follow the same general strategy used for non-daemon ARMORS. When the a r m o r _ t  : : -
Transmit over 
network
daemon_net_mgmt_t
1 Although the daemons that actually execute in the Chameleon environment have network-specific elements for remote 
communication (e.g., daem on_tcp_m gm t_ t), we will abstractly talk about a daem on _ n et_ m g m t_ t element, as the exact 
protocols and networks are unimportant to the understanding of the high-level message routing in Chameleon.
12
p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function receives a message destined for a remote ARMOR (i.e., not the 
daemon), it still encapsulates the message in a MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE message as before. For 
daemons, however, the daem on_np_m gm t_t element (or whatever element that is responsible for the 
local connections) subscribes to this message. Upon receipt of the MSG__TRANSMIT_MESSAGE 
message, the daem on_np_m gm t_t element checks to see if the destination ARMOR is one of the 
locally-installed ARMORS. If so, then the element transmits the message across the appropriate named 
pipe connection. If not, the element assumes the message is destined for a remote ARMOR and 
encapsulates the original message in a MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE_REMOTE message. As expected, 
the daem on_net_m gin t_ t element handles this message and selects the appropriate daemon through 
which the message should be routed2. Figure 6 flowcharts the entire procedure of routing an incoming 
message (regardless of whether the message came from within the daemon or from one of the ARMORS 
connected to the daemon). Keep in mind that the com po u nd _ t and a rm o r_ t objects in Figure 6 both 
refer to the daemon object—since d aem o n _ t derives from a rm o r_ t  and com pound_t, the daemon 
can freely access the compound part of its functionality, as well as its base ARMOR functionality.
2.4 M essage Acknowledgement Strategies
Now that we have a high-level overview of the message routing in the Chameleon environment, we can 
look at the four different kinds o f acknowledgement models that are available for ARMOR-to-ARMOR 
communications. They are:
• non-blocking, unacknowledged send ( e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ m e ssa g e  ())
•  receipt-acknowledged send ( e l e m e n t _ t : : r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ())
• completion-acknowledged send ( e l e m e n t _ t : : c s e n d _ m e ssa g e  ())
•  request/reply sem antics ( e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ r e q u e s t  () and e l e m e n t _ t : : -  
s e n d _ r e p l y ( ) )
We w ill consider each o f these in turn, initially focusing only on inter-ARMOR m essaging.
Obviously, the non-blocking, unacknowledged send is the simplest of the four kinds of message sends. 
Using these semantics, the e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ m e ssa g e  () function returns as soon as the message 
has been sent across the local IPC channel. For non-daemon ARMORS, this means that 
se n d _ m e ssa g e  () returns after the np_m gm t_t element writes the message to the named pipe. This 
fact becomes apparent by looking at a trace of the function calls that occur when sending an outgoing 
message:
e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ m e s s a g e  (m sg )
p a r m o r - > p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  (m sg )
c o m p o u n d _ t :  : d e l i v e r  (MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE)
n p _ m g m t_ _ t: : p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  (MSG_TRANSMIT_MESSAGE) 
n a m e d _ p i p e _ t : :  w r i t e  (m sg)
Since these are all nested function calls, e le m e n t _ t :  : sen d _ m essag e  () will not return until 
n a m e d _ p ip e _ t : :  w r i t e  () returns. Tracing the e l e m e n t _ t : :  sen d _ m essag e  () for elements 
within a daemon show similar results—the function does not return until the data is committed to the 
outgoing IPC channel (be it a named pipe or network connection). True to its intended behavior, the
2 Selecting the appropriate intermediary daemon will be discussed later in the document.
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caller of e l e m e n t _ t :  : s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () does not know if the destination ARMOR received the 
message, or even if the message made it past the local daemon.
To address this problem, Chameleon offers two specific forms of acknowledged sends through the 
e l e m e n t _ t : : r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () and e l e m e n t _ t : : c s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () functions. The 
r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () function will send an acknowledgment to the sender once the destination ARMOR 
has received the message, and c s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () will send an acknowledgement to the sender after 
the destination ARMOR has completed processing the message. Neither of these functions returns until the 
acknowledgement has been received from the destination ARMOR.
Ideally, we would like the same message to be capable of being sent using any one of these three 
acknowledgement semantics. To do this, we need to consistently send and check for acknowledgements 
for all messages. We put this functionality at the a rm o r_ t  level in the form of message pre-processing 
and post-processing.
The com plete processing o f  inter-ARMOR m essages can be divided into three im portant phases:
1. Message pre-processing (done in a r m o r _ t : : p r e p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  ())
2. Message processing (done in a r m o r _ t : : p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  ())
3. Message post-processing (done in a r m o r _ t : : r e t i r e _ m e s s a g e  ( ) )
Phase two consists o f  w hat w e norm ally consider the true processing o f the m essage (i.e., it during this 
phase that the c o m p o u n d _ t  functionality o f the ARMOR delivers the m essage to the appropriate 
elements). D uring pre-processing o f  an incom ing inter-ARMOR m essage, the follow ing operations are 
performed:
• If the ARMOR is the final destination of the message and the message was sent using the r s e n d _ -  
m essag e  () function (indicated by a field in the message header), then send an acknowledgement to 
the sender.
• If the incoming message is an acknowledgement (as indicated by a field in the message header), then 
unblock the sender’s r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () or c se n d _ m e ssa g e  () function call.
Similarly, the ARMOR sends an acknowledgement back to the sender during post-processing if the 
message was sent using the c s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () function.
Finally, the request/reply semantics extend the c se n d _ m e ssa g e  () acknowledgement scheme to 
include response data in the acknowledgement. Typically, an element will need to request information 
from another ARMOR (e.g., a daemon may request that the FTM provide it with the location of a remote 
ARMOR). For instances in which a response is needed before the element may continue, the 
e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ r e q u e s t  () function may be used. When the element calls s e n d _ -  
r e q u e s t  ( ) ,  it specifies a buffer into which the reply of the request should be copied. The remote 
element processing the request uses the special e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ r e p ly  () function when replying 
to a request.
During the pre-processing phase of the reply message, the ARMOR copies the response data from all 
replies into the proper buffer (if any). The pre-processing phase then unblocks the caller of s e n d _ -  
r e q u e s t  ( ) ;  thus, the data is freely available to the requestor when the s e n d _ r e q u e s t  () function 
returns.
For inter-ARMOR m essages, the calling thread o f  r s e n d _ m e s s a g e ( ) ,  c s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ( ) ,  and 
s e n d _ r e q u e s t  ()  m ust block until the ARMOR receives the associated acknow ledgem ent or reply. For 
intra-ARMOR m essages, the m essage transm ission, delivery, and processing all occur w ithin the same 
thread of execution as the calling thread. W hen the function returns, therefore, the caller know s that the
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processing o f  the intra-ARMOR m essage has com pleted. A gain, tracing through the function calls will 
help clarify this point:
e l e m e n t _ t : : s e n d _ m e s s a g e  (m sg )
p a r m o r - > p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  (m sg )  
c o m p o u n d _ t : : d e l i v e r  (m sg )
e l e m e n t _ t : : p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  (m sg )
W hen e l e m e n t _ t : p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  ()  returns (i.e., after the elem ent that ultim ately receives the 
m essage has com pleted processing the m essage), all h igher-nested functions return. U nder these 
circum stances, the behavior o f  the r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ()  is not that interesting; indeed, for intra-ARMOR 
m essages, s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ( ) ,  r s e n d _ m e s s a g e  ( ) ,  c s e n d _ m e s s a g e  () all behave like a 
c s e n d _ m e s s a g e ( )  function— the functions only return w hen the m essage has been com pletely 
processed by the receiving elem ent.
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3 Implementation of Specific a r m o r s
The previous section gave a general overview of the underlying Chameleon infrastructure. In this section, 
we will look at some of the specific ARMORS that have been implemented using this infrastructure. 
Specifically, we will look at the elements that have been designed to provide the bulk of specific ARMOR 
functionality.
3.1 Daemon Implementation
In addition to routing messages as presented in the previous section, the daemon also locally installs new 
ARMORS. To fulfill its responsibilities, each daemon contains the following elements:
• ARMOR Process Management Element
• Named Pipe Management Element
• TCP/IP Connection Element
• Remote ARMOR Location Cache Element
•  ARMOR Installation Coordinator
Each of these elements will be considered in turn.
3.1.1 ARMOR Process Management (daemon_armor__proc_mgmt_t)
This element spawns a new ARMOR process whenever a new ARMOR needs to be installed on the local 
node. In order to install any arbitrary ARMOR, the d aem o n _ arm o r_p ro c_ m g m t_ t element uses an 
ARMOR factory and an ancillary program called c r e a te _ a r m o r .  The exact flow-of-control follows:
1. The daem on a rm o r p ro c  mcrmt t  receives the MSG_DAEMON_SPAWN_ARMOR message that 
contains the ID to give the new ARMOR, the ID of the new ARMOR’S manager (usually the ARMOR 
making the request to install the new ARMOR), and the type of the new ARMOR.
2. The element spawns a new process that executes the c r e a te _ a r m o r  program, passing the 
information found in the MSG_DAEMON_SPAWN_ARMOR message as command-line arguments.
3. The c r e a te _ a r m o r  program uses an ARMOR factory to create a new ARMOR object (a descendant 
of the a rm o r_ t  class in Figure 1).
4. The c r e a t e _ a r m o r  program then calls the a r m o r _ t :  : i n i t  () function for the new ARMOR 
object, causing the ARMOR to be initialized. Usually, the initialization routine adds the elements 
needed to become a specific ARMOR and “connects” the elements together so that they function 
properly. See Appendix A.3 for more details on the role that the i n i t  () function plays during 
element creation (and, in this case, ARMOR creation).
5. The c r e a t e _ a r m o r  program exits only after the ARMOR object has “terminated,” which usually 
happens when the daemon uninstalls the ARMOR.
Note that since the c r e a te _ a r m o r  program instantiates the new ARMOR object in a child process, the 
ARMOR executes in its own address space (under Linux, at least). After spawning the new process, the 
daem o n _arm or_ p ro c_m g m t_ t launches a new thread that calls w a i t p i d  () on the child process to 
detect termination of the ARMOR process. Finally, the element stores relevant information about the new 
ARMOR process (process ID, thread ID of the w a i t p i d  () thread, etc.) in a table for future use.
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3.1.2 Named Pipe Management Element (daem on_np_m gm t_t)
The daem on_np_m gm t_t element performs the following functions for the daemon:
• Establishes a named pipe connection to a new ARMOR process.
• Maintains a table of all ARMORS installed on the node through the daemon.
• Monitors each named pipe for incoming messages from the ARMORS.
• Forwards inter-ARMOR messages to locally-installed ARMORS when applicable.
• Monitors an auxiliary named pipe for incoming messages from the outside world.
The first three actions are triggered by a new ARMOR being installed by the daemon. When the element 
receives the MSG_DAEMON_CONNECT_NEW_ARMOR message, it:
1. Creates and opens a new named pipe for communicating with the new ARMOR process.
2. Adds the ARMOR and named pipe pointer to its list of locally-installed ARMORS.
3. Spawns a new thread to monitor the named pipe for incoming messages from the ARMOR (a new 
thread is needed because we are currently using a blocking read on the named pipe).
Most of the behavior associated with writing to and reading from the named pipe connections has already 
been covered in section 2.3.
In addition to the standard named pipes connecting the local ARMORS to the daemon, the daemon also 
creates an auxiliary named pipe for receiving incoming messages from the outside world (from non- 
ARMOR processes). For example, an early implementation of the Chameleon API for REE applications 
used the auxiliary named pipe to send information to the Chameleon system before it connected to the 
Execution ARMOR . Although the Chameleon API no longer uses auxiliary pipe for this purpose (in fact, 
nothing in the current implementation uses it at all), the ability for non-ARMOR processes to have a well- 
known entry point into the Chameleon system may prove to be beneficial in the long mn. In any case, it 
can easily be removed if it proves to be unnecessary or insecure.
3.1.3 TCP/IP Connection Element (daem on_tcp_m gm t_t)
The d aem o n _ tcp _ m g m t_ t element is a specific instance of the generic daem on_net_m gm t_t 
element described in section 2.3.2. As you might expect, this element manages the TCP/IP connections 
to other daemons in the Chameleon environment.
The central data structure for the daem on_tcp_m gint_ t element is a table that maps daemon IDs to IP 
addresses and port numbers. The element updates this table on demand with help from the master 
daemon. By our current conventions, the first daemon installed in the Chameleon environment becomes 
the master daemon. All other subsequently-installed daemons have the master daemon as their manager.
When the daemon needs to route an outgoing message to a remote daemon, it attempts to locate the 
destination daemon’s ID in its connection table. If it cannot find the remote daemon in its connection 
table, it requests the remote daemon’s IP address and port number from its manager (the master daemon). 
Under our current implementation, therefore, the master daemon should have an entry for each daemon in 
its connection table to satisfy location requests from other daemons.
As a result of this need, all daemons must register with the master daemon upon being installed 
(registration consists of sending the daemon’s IP address and port number on which the daemon accepts 
new connections). Consequently, the entity installing the daemons—be it the user, script, or other 
means—must pass the location of the master daemon as command-line parameters to the daemon 
installation program. After registration, the newly-installed daemon will know how to reach the master
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daemon (necessary for determining the location of other daemons for future communications) and the 
master daemon will have a record of the location of the newly-installed daemon.
In a somewhat separate issue, the TCP/IP protocols mandate that a separate connection be established for 
communicating with each remote daemon. In the interest of keeping a bounded number of open 
connections, we intend to have only n connections be active at any point in time. Although it is not 
currently implemented that way (a connection remains open once established), the idea is to have an 
older, infrequently-used connection be closed when a new connection needs to be made. With this in 
mind, the connection table has a field that stores the socket associated with open connections for each 
daemon in table. It should be noted that although connections may be opened and closed throughout the 
lifetime of the daemon, we do not envisage having to remove the IP address and port number associated 
with a remote daemon from the connection table.
Most of the other responsibilities of the d aem o n _ tcp_ m g rn t_ t element have already been outlined in 
section 2.3.2. To summarize, the d aem o n _ tcp _ m g m t_ t performs the following functions and 
services:
• Keeps a table of the TCP/IP parameters needed to establish a connection with remote daemons; this 
table is updated from the master daemon on an as-needed basis.
• Keeps a small cache of open connections to remote daemons.
• Routes outgoing messages to remote daemons.
• Monitors each open connection for incoming messages.
• Accepts new connections from remote daemons.
As with the daem on_np_m gm t_t element, the d aem o n _ tcp _ m g m t_ t element creates a per open 
connection that monitors for incoming from remote daemons. There is also a single thread that blocks on 
an a c c e p t  () call to handle new connections from remote ARMORS.
3.1.4 Remote armor  Location Cache Element (d aem on _ arm o r_ lo c_m gm t_ t)
The previous section and section 2.3.2 describe a  significant portion o f the m essage routing services that 
daem ons perform  for locally-installed ARMORS. T here rem ains one detail in this procedure— nam ely, 
how  the daem on on the sending end o f an inter-ARMOR m essage know s the rem ote daem on to which the 
m essage should be forw arded. Rem em ber, the m essage header contains only the ID of the destination 
ARMOR, not the ID of the daem on through w hich the destination ARMOR m ay be reached. The 
d a e m o n _ a r m o r _  1 o c _ m g m t_ t  elem ent fills this void.
Simply put, the d aem o n _arm or_ lo c_ m g m t_ t element maintains a cache of frequently-used ARMOR- 
to-daemon mappings. Note that this information is also available to the destination ARMOR’S manager 
(i.e., a manager knows where it has installed its ARMORs). In this respect, the d a e m o n _ a rm o r_ lo c _ - 
m gm t_t serves merely to optimize the routing of messages through daemons. If this element were not 
present, the daemon would be forced to request that the destination ARMOR’S manager provide this 
information for every message going to a remote node.
Although not currently implemented, we will need to make sure that an ARMOR’S entry in all 
daem on_azm or_ loc_m gin t_ t caches be removed or invalidated when the ARMOR is uninstalled.
It should also be noted that since the in form ation found in this cache is a duplicate o f inform ation already 
found in one or more m anagers in the C ham eleon system , the daem ons can easily regenerate the ARMOR- 
to-daem on m appings if  needed. In fact, the cache is initially em pty. W hen the daem on needs to route a 
m essage to a rem ote ARMOR for the first tim e, it m akes a request to its m anager that the ARMOR-to- 
daem on m apping be provided. Recall that the m aster daem on is the m anager for m ost daem ons. If the
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m aster daem on cannot find the ARMOR-to-daemon m apping in its d a e m o n _ a r m o r _ lo c _ m g m t_ t  
elem ent, it asks its m anager (usually the FTM) for the inform ation. Since the FTM is the highest-ranking 
m anager, it contains the ARMOR-to-daemon m appings for every ARMOR in the Cham eleon environment.
3.1.5 ARMOR Installation Coordinator (daemon_armor_install_t)
Finally, the d a e m o n _ a r m o r _ in s ta l l_ t  element oversees the installation of a new ARMOR by the 
daemon by performing the following steps upon receiving a MSG_DAEMON_ARMOR_INSTALL message:
1. Creates a new ARMOR process by sending a MSG_DAEMON_S PAWN_ARMOR message to itself.
2. Connects the new ARMOR process to the daemon through the MSG_DAEMON_- 
CONNECT_NEW_ARMOR message.
MSGJDAEMON_INSTALL_ARMOR MSG_DAEMON_INSTALL_ARMOR
(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) Coordinator-invoked functionality; (b) “Domino-invoked” functionality
These two steps indirectly invoke the services of the daem o n_p ro c_m gm t_ t element and the 
daem on_np_m gm t_t element. Graphically, the role of the coordinator may be depicted in Figure 7(a). 
As an alternative to having a coordinator oversee the functionality invocation, we could have the 
d aem o n_p ro c_m gm t_ t element subscribe to the MSG_DAEMON_INSTALL_ARMOR message as its 
primary input. The daem on_np_m gint_t element—the element whose functionality must be invoked 
based on information obtained from the first element—can then subscribe to the completion message of 
the daem on__proc_m gm t_t element. The latter technique has the added advantage of one fewer 
element, but the disadvantage in that the functionality of the d aem on_proc_m gm t_ t element cannot 
be invoked without triggering the daem on_np_m gm t_t element—the domino effect, so to speak. 
Although the domino effect would be acceptable for this specific example (very rarely would you want to 
launch a new ARMOR process without it establishing a connection via a named pipe), the same cannot be 
said for any arbitrary multi-element interaction.
To clarify, the ARMOR installation currently utilizes a coordinator element—the alternative is presented 
here mainly as another design option.
3.2 Manager Implementation
In the Chameleon environment, managers are responsible for initiating the installation of ARMORS and for 
recovering from failed subordinate ARMORS3. Although there are several specific kinds of managers, all 
managers must provide this functionality and, therefore, contain the following elements:
•  ARMOR Location Table Element
3 Recovery of failed a r m o r s  has not been fully implemented.
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•  ARMOR Installation Coordinator
We have also implemented a specific type of manager—the surrogate manager—for overseeing an 
application executing in the Chameleon environment.
3.2.1 General Manager Functionality
In this section, we will discuss the two elements that are common to all managers. In fact, adding these 
elements to a generic a rm o r_ t  “skeleton” turns the ordinary ARMOR into a manager.
3.2.1.1 ARMOR Location Table (mgr_amror_loc_db_t)
Managers keep the following information for all subordinate ARMORS:
•  ARMOR ID
• Daemon on which the ARMOR is installed
• Immediate manager o f the ARMOR
Note that by subordinate ARMORS, we mean not only those ARMORS directly installed by the manager, but 
all descendant ARMORS. For example, Figure 8 illustrates a typical manager-subordinate relationship. 
Here, we have an MPI application overseen by Surrogate Manager A, and a replicated MPI application 
overseen by Surrogate Manager B. The managerial scope of Surrogate Manager A contains Execution 
ARMORS 1 - 3 .  The scope of Surrogate Manager B, however, contains Surrogate Manager C, Surrogate 
Manager D, and the Voter ARMOR (those ARMORS directly installed by Surrogate Manager B), as well as 
Execution ARMORS 4 - 9 .  As a result, the m g r_ a rm o r_ lo c _ d b _ t element for Surrogate Manager B 
will contain entries for all of these ARMORS within its scope. The FTM, by the same logic, will contain 
entries for every ARMOR installed in the Chameleon environment.4
FTM I
Surrogate Manager A | Surrogate Manager B 1 Backup FTM ]
-  ^ x e c u t i o n ^ R M jD R j l  ^ ï ï ü ô g â t ^ ^ n â g ë ^ J  Surrogate M anager D j Voter ARMOR
-  Execution A R M 0 R 2 I
-  Execution ARMOR 3 I
Execution ARMOR 4
— Execution ARMOR 5 I
11— Execution ARMOR 6
Execution AR M O R  7
— Execution A R M O R  8
I— Execution A R M O R  9
Figure 8: Example managerial relationships
Upon installing a new ARMOR, the manager not only updates its own m g r_ a rm o r_ lo c _ d b _ t  table, but 
also sends an update message to its manager, which recursively sends an update message to its manager,
and so on, until the message reaches the FTM.
4 It is this feature that allows the master daemon to make requests to the FTM to determine an ARMOR-to-daemon mapping for 
any a r m o r  in the system. Section 3.1.4 describes how the daemon uses this information.
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3.2 .1 .2  ARMOR Installation Coordinator ( m g r _ a r m o r _ i n s t a l l _ t )
Like daemons, managers contain an element that oversees the installation of a new ARMOR. Specifically, 
the m g r _ a r m o r _ i n s t a l l _ t  element performs the following steps upon receipt of a MGR_- 
MANAGER_INSTALL_ARMOR message:
1. Sends a MSG_DAEMON_INSTALL_ARMOR message to the appropriate daemon.
2. Updates the m anager’s ARMOR location table via the MSG_MANAGER_REGISTER_ARMOR m essage.
3.2.2 Surrogate Manager Functionality
Surrogate managers behave like ordinary managers with the additional ability to oversee an application 
under the Chameleon environment. Typically, a single application will consist of several processes— 
either an MPI application running in simplex mode, for example, or a standalone application that is 
replicated across multiple nodes. In both of these cases, the surrogate manager will need to install several 
Execution ARMORS, configure the Execution ARMORS, start application execution, and (possibly) stop 
application execution.
In this section, we will examine the surrogate manager functionality that applies to a generic 
application—MPI or otherwise. Specific extensions to the surrogate manager for supporting MPI 
applications will be considered in section 4.
A generic surrogate manager contains the following elements:
• Application Configuration Parameters Element
• Execution ARMOR Management Element (sm_exec_mgmt_t)
3.2.2.1 Application Configuration Parameters Element (a p p _ p a r a m _ t)
The app__param _t element stores the executable name, working directory, and command-line 
arguments for application(s) overseen by the surrogate manager. Although we mostly speak of the 
surrogate manager as overseeing a single application, we have designed all of the surrogate manager 
elements to accommodate more than one application. To distinguish these applications overseen by the 
same surrogate manager, the manager gives each application an application context ID.
The app__param _t element creates a new application context ID (reserves data structure space for a 
new application) upon receipt of a MSG_APP_CREATE_NEW_APP_CONTEXT message. After 
allocating a new ID, the a p p _ p a ra m _ t publishes a MSG_APP_ANNOUNCE_NEW_APP_CONTEXT 
message. Other elements within the surrogate manager may subscribe to this message to allocate their 
own data structures for use with a new application.
3.2.2.2 Execution ARMOR Management Element (s m _ e x e c _ m g m t_ t)
Surrogate managers work closely with subordinate Execution ARMORS to execute the user application 
under a particular fault-tolerant execution strategy. Because of the important role that Execution ARMORS 
play, an element in the surrogate manager dedicates itself to keeping important information about the 
Execution ARMORS. Currently, the element keeps the following information for each Execution ARMOR 
overseen by the surrogate manager:
• Daemon on which the ARMOR is installed.
• Surrogate manager’s application context ID (the identifier the surrogate manager uses to distinguish 
between multiple applications that it oversees).
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• Execution ARMOR’S application context ID (to distinguish between the applications for which the 
individual Execution ARMOR is responsible).
• Status flags for the Execution ARMOR (idle, executing application, application terminated, etc.).
Although some of this information can also be found in the m g r_ a rm o r_ lo c_ d b _ t element (such as 
the daemon on which the ARMOR is installed), the sm _exec_m gm t_t has its own copy mainly for 
performance reasons. It keeps its tables updated by subscribing to relevant messages that the manager 
already generates (e.g., it can update its status flags by subscribing to the M S G _ A P P _ N O T IF Y _ - 
TER M IN A TIO N  message).
3.3 Execution arm or  Implementation
Each user application process executing in the Chameleon environment is overseen by an Execution 
ARMOR. To deal with these application-related duties, Execution ARMORS are composed of the following 
elements:
• Application Configuration Parameters Element
• Application Process Management Element
• Application Named Pipe Management Element
3.3.1 Application Configuration Parameters Element ( a p p _ p a r a m _ t )
Execution ARMORS use the same a p p _ p a r a m _ t  element as surrogate managers to store relevant 
application parameters. Consequently, Execution ARMORS also have the ability to oversee more that one 
application, each application being identified through an application context ID allocated by the 
a P P _ p a r a m _ t  element.
It should be noted that at the present time 
there is no correlation between the 
application context IDs kept by the 
surrogate manager and the application 
context IDs kept by the Execution ARMORS.
The surrogate manager, for example, may 
refer to a specific application (consisting of 
a set of processes) by application context ID 
2 within its own internal data structures.
When it assigns one of these application 
processes to an Execution ARMOR, 
however, the Execution ARMOR may 
allocate application context ID 1 for the 
process. An example of this can be found 
in Figure 9.
In any case, the most important point is that 
both surrogate managers and Execution 
ARMORS use the app__param _t to storeapplication configuration information, Figure 9: Sample Application Context ID Assignments 
and both use application context IDs to 
identify their applications.
Surrogate Manager Application Table
SM App 
ID
App
Name
Exec
ARMOR
Exec App 
ID
1 kmeans A 1
1 kmeans B 2
1 kmeans C 1
2 abft_mm B 1
2 abft_mm C 2
1: kmeans (1)
ARMOR A
Execution ARMORs:
1: abft_mm(l)
2: kmeans (2 )
ARMOR B
1 :k m e a n s (3)
2: abf t _ m m (2 )
ARMOR C
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3.3.2 Application Process Management ( a p p _ s p a w n _ t )
The a p p _ sp a w n _ t performs many of the tasks that directly work with the application process, 
including:
Spawning a new child application process.
Registering an existing application process with the Execution ARMOR.
Forcibly terminating an application process.
For the most part, this element handles anything that deals with the process ID of a specific application 
process. Upon request, the a p p _ sp a w n _ t will spawn a new child process to execute an application. 
The element can also “register” an existing application process (one that wasn’t spawned through 
Chameleon) by adding its process ED to the a p p _ p a ram _ t element’s table. After a process has been 
registered (either as. a result of it being created by the Execution ARMOR or as a result of the Execution 
ARMOR attaching itself to an existing application), the a p p _ p a ra m _ t publishes an 
MSG_ANNOUNCE_NEW_APP_PROCES S message. Other elements may subscribe to this message if they 
wish to be notified whenever the Execution ARMOR begins to oversee a new application process.
3.3.3 Application Named Pipe Management ( a p p _ n p _ m g m t_ t)
Chameleon intends to export an API to the user application through which the application can notify 
Chameleon of any errors it detects, suggest recovery strategies, change the fault-tolerant execution 
strategy under which it is running, etc. To support this API, the application must be able to contact 
Chameleon in some way. In our current design, the application will interface only with the Execution 
ARMOR through a dedicated named pipe.
The app_np_m gm t_ t creates and maintains this dedicated connection with the application. Upon being 
notified of a new application process through the MSG_ANNOUNCE_NEW_APP_PROCESS message, the 
app_np_m gm t_ t creates a named pipe based on the process ID of the application. Once the application 
process opens the other end of the named pipe, a connection is successfully established.
Since the Execution ARMOR must respond to requests by the application, the a p p _ n p _ m g m t_ t  has 
many of the message processing capabilities of the n p _ m g m t_ t  element. Some similarities include:
Monitoring the named pipe for incoming messages from the application (this is done in a separate thread).
F o rw a rd in g  a ll in c o m in g  m e ssa g e s  to  th e  E x ecu tio n  ARMOR’S a rm o r_ t::p ro c e ss_ m e ssa g e ()  function . 
S in c e  th is  is sam e  en try  p o in t u se d  fo r  o th e r  intra-ARMOR and  inter-ARMOR m e ssa g e s , th e  m e ssag e  w ill be 
ro u te d  to  its ap p ro p ria te  d e s tin a tio n  w ith  n o  fu rth e r inv o lv em en t on  th e  p a rt o f  ap p _ n p _ m g m t_ t.
When the a p p _ n p _ m g m t_ t  element is included in the Execution ARMOR , it becomes responsible for 
detecting an application process failure. If the application process terminates abnormally, then the 
blocking read that a thread in the a p p _ n p _ m g m t_ t  element performs on the named pipe will return 
with an error value.
The app_np_m gm t_ t serves as a good example for the composable ARMOR architecture of Chameleon. 
Configuring an ordinary Execution ARMOR to support an application that uses the Chameleon API is as 
easy as adding the app _ np _ m gm t_ t element to the Execution ARMOR. Other elements do not need to 
be concerned with the presence or absence of app_np_m gm t_t—all of its functionality is “added on” to 
existing functionality without the other elements even knowing it.
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4 Extensions for MPI
The previous section outlined the specific elements that provide functionality found in various types of 
ARMORS. Wherever possible, these elements were designed to handle MPI and non-MPI applications 
alike. As it turns out, the current incarnation of Chameleon only makes extensions to the surrogate 
manager to handle MPI applications. This section describes the new elements that need to be added to a 
surrogate manager for it to oversee MPI applications. It also gives us the opportunity to discuss a 
particular feature of the ARMOR architecture that facilitates extensions such as these.
It should be noted that these elements have been developed for MPICH, a portable implementation of 
MPI that uses TCP/IP to communicate among the MPI processes. Features of the elements that are 
specific to MPICH will be noted when applicable.
4.1 Chain-of-Command for MPI Applications
Being that an MPI application typically consists of several processes, actions that involve the entire 
application must be coordinated among all processes. A surrogate manager provides this coordination for 
a single MPI application, implying that there may be several surrogate managers active at any one time in 
the Chameleon system. Each surrogate manager uses an Execution ARMORS to oversee each MPI process. 
Like generic Execution ARMORS, they reside on the same node on which the MPI process is running.
FTM |
MPI Surrogate ManagerB 
(abft_mm)
Execution ARMOR 5 I- Execution ARMOR 9 1
ab ft_ iran H a b f  t_mm 1—
Execution A R M O R  6 1- - Execution A R M O R  10 |
Ha b f  t_inm a b f  t_mm 1—
Execution A R M O R  7 L Execution A R M O R  11 1
H
a b ft_ m m a b f  t_mm V -
Execution A R M O R  8 | - Execution A R M O R  12 1
h
abft_xnm a b f  t_mm I—
Figure 10: Typical manager-subordinate relationships for MPI applications
Execution ARMORS, in fact, are the only direct contact that the MPI application has with the Chameleon 
environment. Execution ARMORS consult the surrogate manager when necessary (such as upon detecting 
an application error), and the surrogate managers consult their manager (most likely the FTM) only when 
necessary (such as when the surrogate manager needs to restart the application on a different set of 
nodes).
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Figure 10 shows what these manager-subordinate relationships might look like if two MPI applications 
were running in the Chameleon environment.
4.2 Launching an MPICH Application
The MPICH implementation of MPI provides the m p i r u n  script for starting MPI applications. We will 
briefly review the steps that MPICH takes to start an MPI application and then see what role Chameleon 
plays in this process.
When using m p iru n , the user typically specifies the MPI application to run and the number of nodes. 
Using this information, the following sequence of operations are performed:
•  m p i r u n  consults a machine list file (a file that contains all of the machine names available for 
executing MPI applications) and extracts the appropriate number of machine names. Using these 
machine names, m p i r u n  generates a p r o c g r o u p  file that resembles:
c i s m l  / h o m e / r e e / a p p s / k m e a n s / k m e a n s
c i s m 2  / h o m e / r e e / a p p s / k m e a n s / k m e a n s
c i s m 4  / h o m e / r e e / a p p s / k m e a n s / k m e a n s
c i s m 6  / h o m e / r e e / a p p s / k m e a n s / k m e a n s
The important things to notice about the p ro c g ro u p  file are that the file contains the machines on 
which to execute the MPI application ( c i s m { l , 2 / 4 / 6>) and the executable name that can be used 
for the specific machine.
mpirun then starts the MPI application with the following command:
•  < p r o g r a m - n a m e >  < p r o g r a m - a r g s >  - p 4 p g  < p r o c g r o u p - f i l e n a m e >
• The master MPI process begins executing; one of the first functions that it calls will be the 
M P I _ I n i t ( )  function.
• In M P I _ I n i t  ( ) ,  the master process uses the p ro c g ro u p  file identified on the command line to get 
the list of machines on which the slave processes should be executed.
• For each target machine, M P I _ I n i t  () uses r s h  to remotely-execute the slave MPI processes. The 
exact command that the r s h  executes on the remote nodes resembles:
•  < p r o g r a m - n a m e >  < m a s t e r - n o d e >  < m a s t e r - p o r t >  - p 4 a m s l a v e
•  T he slave processes begin executing, again calling their M P I _ I n i t ( )  function. This tim e, the 
M P I _ I n i t  () function can detect that they are slave processes by the “ - p 4 a m s l a v e ” com m and­
line argum ent. U sing the < m a s t e r - n o d e >  and < m a s t e r - p o r t >  argum ents, M P I _ I n i t ( )  
establishes a connection with the m aster M PI process and retrieves the application com m and-line 
argum ents.
In order to fully execute within the Chameleon environment, we need to have an Execution ARMOR 
oversee each application process. For non-MPI applications, we can simply have the Execution ARMOR 
spawn the application process, itself. But such a solution for MPI applications would be rather 
intrusive—we would have to circumvent the call to r s h  used by MPICH.
Rather than doing this, Chameleon allows the MPI application to launch as usual and then attaches to the 
application processes. By attaching, we mean that the Execution ARMOR creates and connects to the 
named pipe that the application will use for the Chameleon API. In order to successfully attach to the 
Execution ARMORS, the MPI application must make a call to c h m _ i n i t  () rather than M P I _ I n i t  ( ) .
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So, under Chameleon, MPI applications are executed as follows:
The surrogate manager is provided with the application’s executable name and a list of daemons on which
to run the application.
1. The surrogate manager translates the daemon list into a list of machine names suitable for the 
procgroup file. Using this list and the application’s executable name, a p ro c g ro u p  file is 
generated.
2. The surrogate manager installs an Execution ARMOR on each node specified in the daemon list. 
These Execution ARMORS will each eventually oversee an individual application process.
3. The surrogate manager instructs the Execution ARMOR to begin executing the MPI application. The 
Execution ARMOR does this by using the same command that m p i r u n  uses (see step 2 above).
4. The master MPI'process makes a call to c h m _ in i t  ( ) .
5. The master MPI process calls MPI_Init () to launch the slave processes as before.
6. The master MPI process then calls M PI_R ecv () once for each slave process to retrieve the machine 
name on which the slave process is executing and the slave process ID5.
7. The master process attaches to the Execution ARMOR by opening the named pipe identified by its 
process ID. Note that since the Execution ARMOR directly spawned the master MPI process and is 
aware of the process ID of the master process, the Execution ARMOR has already created the 
application named pipe (see section 3.3.3).
8. After collecting the machine name and process ID from the slave processes, the master MPI process 
forwards the information to the surrogate manager through the application named pipe.
9. Upon executing, the slave processes call chm_init () which then calls MPI_In.it () as usual.
10. The slave processes use MPI_Send () to send their machine name and process ID to the master MPI 
process.
11. Upon receiving the slave process information from the master MPI process, the surrogate manager 
notifies the Execution ARMOR on each of the specified nodes as to the process ID of the locally- 
executing slave process. Using this information, the local Execution ARMOR can successfully create 
and open its application named pipe.
12. The slave processes attach themselves to the pre-installed Execution ARMOR by opening the named 
pipe associated with their process ID.
To summarize the important points:
• Only the master process is directly spawned by an Execution ARMOR; therefore, the master MPI 
process is the only true child process of an Execution ARMOR.
• The slave processes attach themselves to the local Execution ARMOR.
• The Execution ARMORS and slave process agree to use process IDs to reference the application named 
pipes. Because of this, the Execution ARMORS become aware of the slave process IDs through the 
c h m _ in i t  () function.
5 Remember, to attach to the Execution ARMOR the application must open the Execution ARMOR’S named pipe. This named 
pipe is referenced by the process ID of the application (see section 3.3.3); hence, the Execution ARMOR must know the 
application’s process ID in order correctly create the named pipe.
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4.3 MPI Execution arm or  Management Element (m p i_ s m _ e x e c _ m g m t_ t)
For the time being, generic surrogate managers only need to add the m p i_sm _ex ec_ m g m t_ t element 
in order to manage an MPI application. The m pi_sm _exec_m gm t_t element is a special kind of 
element designed to augment the sm _exec_m gm t_t element.
Recall that the sm _exec_m gm t_t stores information relevant to each Execution ARMOR managed by 
the surrogate manager. The m pi_sm _exec_m gm t_ t takes this base data and adds the machine name 
on which the Execution ARMORS are installed (for use when generating the p ro c g r o u p  file). This is in 
stark contrast to other elements whose operations are wholly-independent of one another. If the 
sm _exec_m gm t_t element and the mp i_ sm _ ex e  c_m gm t_t element were to be truly independent, 
then most of the information in the sm _exec_m gm t_t element would have to be duplicated in the 
m pi_sm _exec_m gm t_t element. Although in this case the amount of overlap would be small, the 
circumstances gave us the opportunity to explore what may be an important design alternative in the 
future.
The relationship between the sm _exec_m gin t_t element and the m p i_sm _exec_m g m t_ t element 
bears some resemblance to “friend” classes in C++. In this case, the sm _exec_m gm t_ t elements 
allows other elements to access its “private” data structures. This access, however, is done in a controlled 
manner to ensure that reconfigurability properties of the ARMOR are not sacrificed. An explanation of this 
procedure follows.
For the sake of clarity, let us call sm _exec_m gm t_t element the “base” element and the 
m pi_sm _exec_m gm t_t element the “extension” element. The base element must, in effect, open itself 
up to the extension elements by providing the following features:
The base element’s data structures must have user-defined pointer fields so that the extension elements 
may augment each entry in the data structure. For example, the sm_exec_mgmt_t data structure for each 
entry in its table may look like6: 
typedef struct
{
}
armor_id_t
daemon_id_t
dword
app_id_t
app_id_t
void
entry_t;
idArmor; 
idDaemon; 
dwStatus; 
idAppMgr; 
idAppExec; 
*pvExtension;
// Execution ARMOR ID
// Daemon on which ARMOR resides
// Status flags
// Surrogate manager's application ID 
// Execution ARMOR'S application ID 
// Points to data specific to 
// extension elements
Here, p v E x t e n s i o n  may point to a linked list of structures, each structure belonging to a different 
extension element (there may be several elements extending a base element).
The base element must have an “access” message through which the extension elements may access the 
base element.
The last bullet will be explained through a rather trivial example. Suppose that the 
m p i_ s m _ e x e c _ m g m t_ t  element (the extension element) appends the machine name to the entries for 
each of the Execution ARMORS in the s m _ e x e c _ m g m t_ t  element. Let’s say that the
m p i_ s m _ e x e c _ m g m t_ t  now needs to retrieve the machine name that corresponds to a particular
6 See section 3.2.2.2 for a more thorough discussion of the core data fields within the sm _exec_m gm t_ t table.
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Execution ARMOR. To do this, m pi_sm _exec_m gm t_t defines a special function, say 
g e t_ m a ch in e _ n a m e  () , that will operate directly on sm _ exec_ m gm t_ t’s data structure.
This point is important enough to justify repeating— extension elements assume direct knowledge o f the 
implementation o f their base elements. The primary advantage is, of course, performance. It is, however, 
markedly different than treating other elements within the ARMOR as black-box entities.
In order to preserve the reconfigurability properties of the ARMOR, all access to the elements must be 
through message passing (and, hence, through the parent compound of the element). Herein lies the role 
of the “access” message identified in the previous bullet—to provide a message-passing interface from 
the extension element’s point of view.
Concretely speaking, the base element must subscribe to and handle a specific access function—in our 
trivial example, MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE. A parameter in this message specifies the extension 
element’s function that should be applied to the base element’s data structure. In our example, the 
relevant code would look something like this:
sm_ e x e  c_mgm t _  t :
sm_exec_mgmt_t : :process_message (msg)
{
case MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE:
* (msg.user_func) (table, msg.param);
>
//Call extension's function 
//on the table (NOTE: The 
//call is made from "within" 
// the base element.)
mpi_sm_exec_Tngmt_ t
mpi_sm_exec_mgmt_t: :get_machine_name (table_t *ptable, param)
{
for each entry in ptable
if (entry.idArmor == param.idArmor) // Directly examine entries
copy entry.machine_name to param.buffer // in base element's table
Then, to actually call the g e t_ m ach in e_ n am e  () function on sm _exec_m gm t_t’s table, 
m p i_sm _exec_m gm t_ t would send the MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE message as an intra- 
ARMOR message, specifying the g e t_ m ach in e_ n am e  () function and other specific parameters in the 
payload area of the message. This has the following advantages and ramifications:
Since we are still going through the normal message delivery services, the parent compound is still the 
only entity that directly accesses the sm_exec_mgmt_t element.
•  Since we never directly interact with the sm _exec_m gm t_ t element (only through the 
MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE message), the m p i_sm _exec_m g m t_ t is not dependent on the 
specific element type sm _exec_m gm t_t being present in the ARMOR—only an element with the 
same base data structure and one that subscribes to the MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE message.
•  The previous two points imply that the reconfigurability properties of the ARMOR remain intact.
•  The extension element must have intimate knowledge of the base element’s data structure (e.g., the 
m p i_sm _exec_m gm t_ t knows that the sm _ exec_ m gm t_ t’s table entries contain an id A r m o r  
field).
•  Since the MSG_SM_EXEC_ACCESS_TABLE is sent as an intra-ARMOR message, only an indirect 
function call results.
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• Not every element may automatically be a base element—they have to be designed that way, 
although making the necessary changes to existing elements is not prohibitive.
• Extension elements are dependent upon the base element existing in the ARMOR; the reverse in not 
true.
• By using access messages, the extensions elements essentially have to gain “permission” from the 
base element before manipulating the base element’s data structures.
We feel that extension elements may prove to be a valuable trade-off between efficiency and pure element 
“isolation.” In essence, we keep the elements isolated enough to provide reconfigurabilty by mandating 
that extension elements access base elements through the message passing interface, while we keep the 
extension elements efficient by allowing them to directly manipulate the data structures of the base 
element.
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5 Concepts in Error Detection
All the functionality in Chameleon is derived from ARMORS. For the environment to be resilient to faults, 
the ARMORS themselves have to be made resilient. In the sections that follow, we propose a hierarchical 
structure for error detection in Chameleon ARMORS. The hierarchy of detection techniques is arranged in 
four logical levels as shown in Figure 11.
Location
Figure 11: Hierarchy of ARMOR Error Detection
The error detection mechanisms in Chameleon are encapsulated in four logical levels. A level is denoted 
lower than another if it is implemented closer to the ARMOR being monitored. The chain of error detection 
starts from the lowest level, and errors not captured at the lower levels bubble up to the higher levels. 
Because each level may incorporate a suite of detection techniques,.a level is characterized by the 
participating ARMORS. Some level—or, more precisely, some techniques within a level—may be active all 
the time with a certain periodicity of activation (e.g., the smart heartbeat from the daemon to the local 
ARMORS), while some others are activated when some trigger event happens (e.g., the consistency 
protocol in Level 4). The sites at which each of the four levels execute are shown in Figure 12.
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A1 and A2 are two ARMOR replicas, Ml and M2 are replicas of the manager. 
Dj is the daemon on the same node as ARMOR I 
L I, L2, L3, L4 are the respective detection levels
Figure 12: Locality of the Error Detection Levels
Level 1 (lowest level) consists of detecting errors locally and internally in the ARMOR. Support for this 
level is provided at the time of design of the ARMORS—either by building some capability (like signature 
generation) into each ARMOR, or by providing a specialized element (like the Monitor Element in each 
ARMOR). Level 2 consists of detection by the daemon performed on the same node as the ARMOR. The 
same daemon is responsible for monitoring all the locally-installed ARMORS. Levels 3 and 4 utilize 
multiple nodes for doing the error detection. They use message passing between distributed processes to 
perform the detection. The Level 3 message exchanges take place between an ARMOR and its replicas, 
while those of Level 4 take place between an ARMOR and its replicas, and a manager and its replicas.
Our discussion begins by introducing ARMOR signatures, an integral component of Levels 2, 3 and 4. 
Next, we present the ARMOR hierarchy with an ARMOR identification system, concept of ARMOR state and 
its relation to an ARMOR’S position in the ARMOR hierarchy. Then, we present the detection Levels 1 and 
2 which execute internally in the same node as the ARMOR. Next, we describe the specification of the 
protocols in Levels 3 and 4 along with the assumptions and some suggested optimizations and recovery 
strategies. Finally, we present the interaction between the different detection levels through the example 
of the lifetime of a synthetic single-task application running in the Chameleon
5.1 A R M O R  Signatures
An ARMOR uses signatures to validate the integrity of another ARMOR in Chameleon. A signature 
generally consists of a data portion and a control portion. For purposes of detection, a receiver has to 
recreate a golden signature of the sender during comparison. The control part of the signature is pre- 
loaded in the receiver in the form of a set of possible patterns from the sender. The data portion of the 
signature is computed by the receiver prior to the comparison. It is meaningful to compute the data 
signature only on a shared and consistent data structure. Therefore, for interactions between certain 
ARMORs with no such shared data structure, the signature only consists of the control portion.
5.1.1 Control Signatures
The control part of the signature identifies the control flow of the ARMOR. This can be computed from the 
control flow graph of the ARMOR. For example, consider the control flow graph of an ARMOR in Figure 
13, where each rectangle is a logical block of execution in the ARMOR. Valid control flows for the 
ARMOR can be specified by the regular expression A.(B.(C.DIE))*. The sender sends the control flow 
state at the time of sending the signature. This is checked for truth or falsity according to the regular 
expression pre-loaded in the receiver. Since an ARMOR is composed of elements executing in no fixed
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order, the control part of the ARMOR signature is derived by combining the control signatures from its 
constituent elements. When an element is invoked by the message delivery function of its parent 
compound, it writes its signature in the data structure in which the incremental ARMOR signature is 
constructed. Naturally, this data structure is shared among all the elements in the ARMOR.
Figure 13: Sample control flow graph of an element used in control 
signature computation
Signatures are unique to an ARMOR. A particular ARMOR, independent of whether it is acting as a primary 
or a backup, will have a unique golden signature which is a set of its possible valid control flows. If the 
replicas are passive, then the signature generated by them will obviously be much simpler than that 
generated by the primary. However, it will still match one of the valid control-flow signatures stored at 
the receiver. The utility of treating primary and backups alike from the point of view of signature is two­
fold. First, in the implementation of the system, the primary and the backup will have the same ARMOR 
code. A flag determines if the ARMOR behaves as a primary or a backup. If it acts as a passive backup, 
there will be a separate element, with the functionality of keeping consistent state, that will be activated 
and all other elements will be inactive. Second, the backup ARMORS may switch from a passive to an 
active role (say, for some critical operations like deciding to terminate an application). In that case, 
having the same signature for the ARMOR in both active and passive role, obviates the necessity of re­
loading the signature for the replica, that has just turned active, at the receiver.
Since there is no inherent ordering between the activations of elements that compose an ARMOR, the 
control flow of an ARMOR is essentially the combination of the control flows of its constituent elements. 
The control flow of an element can be computed at a coarse or a fine level of granularity. At a coarse 
level, the element signature consists of the valid input and output message pairs for the element. In 
practice, this is expected to capture most control flow errors in an ARMOR. It is less probable that an 
element fails in such a way that it accepts a valid input message, and produces a valid output message but 
the intermediate processing is erroneous. In case such a failure mode also needs to be covered, an element 
can produce signature at the finer level of granularity. At the finer level of granularity, the control flow 
within the element is also captured. Either the designer of the element inserts code in the element at 
appropriate points, or a tool decomposes the element into its basic blocks and assigns unique IDs to each 
basic block. The latter strategy is dependent on obtaining a tool which would do the decomposition of the 
element and also append the signature at the basic block level. The first strategy places the responsibility 
on the ARMOR designer for identifying appropriate points (at which points the control flow is sought to be 
tracked) in the element code and inserting code for the signature.
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5.1.1.1 Control Signature Generation and Propagation
The signature is not very useful unless it can be propagated to other ARMORS which are responsible for 
error checking. Also, the checker must have a golden copy of the signature against which the received 
signature can be compared. Thus, methods have to be defined for pre-loading the golden copy of the 
signature of an ARMOR into possible checkers and to distribute the ARMOR’S signature to its checkers 
during execution when one of the error detection levels requires signature checking. When an ARMOR is 
installed, in the initialization phase, all its constituent elements register the messages they want to 
subscribe to with the compound level of the ARMOR. This is augmented to make the element also register 
the output message it generates for each of the input messages. It may be recollected that this pair is 
precisely the coarse-grained control signature for the element. After initialization, this signature is 
available internally in the ARMOR. The ARMOR forwards this signature to the local daemon. This is used 
by the daemon to check the integrity of the ARMOR in Level 2 of error detection (See section 6.2 for 
details of the detection). To enable Levels 3 and 4 of detection, the signature must also be available with 
some remote ARMORS (e.g., the replicas of an ARMOR for Level 3 of detection). The transmission of the 
control signature occurs to these other ARMORS through the daemon. Along with the forwarding of the 
signature to the daemon, the ARMOR distributes its valid signatures to the other appropriate ARMORS 
through the daemon. The finer-grained control-flow signature is also propagated in a similar manner. 
Here, the element’s initialization phase involves additional code through which the element registers its 
signature with the ARMOR at the compound level. This then forwards it to the daemon, which then 
distributes it to the appropriate ARMORS.
Figure 14: Control Flow Signature Generation and Propagation
During execution of the ARMOR, its signature is computed and propagated to the checkers. For the coarse­
grained signature, this occurs as a natural consequence of the message handling by the element. When a 
message is delivered to an element, and when a message is generated by an element, this information is
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registered at the compound level in the ARMOR. This information is propagated to other ARMORS (like the 
local daemon and other replicas) when queried as part of detection at Levels 2, 3 or 4. For the fine­
grained control flow signature in the element, the element designer calls a function that writes the 
signature in a shared data structure at the ARMOR level. After that, the propagation is done on receiving a 
query just as in the previous case. The signature is also propagated to the daemon when the ARMOR 
generates a message to be routed through the daemon. The scheme of signature generation and 
propagation as well as the concepts of associating both coarse and fine-grained signatures with threads 
within an element, an element within an ARMOR as well as an ARMOR in a node are all shown 
schematically in Figure 14.
Figure 14 shows an example of an ARMOR A1 and the local Daemon D. A1 has two elements—E l and 
E2. Element E l has two threads of execution—T1 and T2. The mnning example for signature generation 
is given for the thread T1 in the element E l of the ARMOR A l. The checker for the signature is Daemon 
D. Element E l is initialized after the ARMOR Al is installed. During initialization, E l registers the 
following information with the compound level of ARMOR Al:
• The set of valid input-output messages for T l. In the example, this is (11,01),(12,02). [Note that a 
single element can subscribe to multiple messages and can produce multiple output messages in 
response to an input message.]
• The valid signature of T l . In the example, this is given by the regular expression
[ SI . ( ( S2 . S3 ) | S4 ) ] *
This registration information comprises the Registration Information Table (RIT). The registration of the 
acceptable input messages by an element occurs in the Chameleon environment, irrespective of any error 
detection mechanisms, for its natural message delivery functionality. Hence, piggybacking the extra 
signature information at the registration phase does not incur any substantially additional overhead. After 
registering this information internally in the ARMOR, the ARMOR propagates its RIT to the local daemon. 
This RIT sent to the daemon forms part of the Golden Signature Table (GST) for ARMOR
The above discussion covers events that take place at the time of initialization of the ARMOR. During the 
execution of the ARMOR, the runtime signature has to be generated and made available to any checkers 
like the daemon. This is achieved by incrementally constructing the signature that is being generated in a 
data structure called the Runtime Signature Table (RST). This RST is communicated to the checkers 
either synchronously (e.g., when the daemon checks for ARMOR signature with a certain periodicity) or 
asynchronously (e.g., the case where the signature is checked on activation of a detection protocol). In the 
example, the thread T l has executed the blocks whose signatures are SI, S2 and S3; it had been activated 
by an input message II and generated an output message 01. The E m i t  routine which is called within a 
thread of an element writes into the RST at the compound level. Observe that at the current control flow 
signature of T l (in E l which is in A l) is valid. If this holds for every thread in the ARMOR, then the 
ARMOR will be certified as functioning correctly by the local daemon.
5.1.2 Data Signatures
The data part of the signature is obtained by executing a hashing function on some data structure that is 
shared among a set of ARMORS. In the sections that follow, we will consistently use the ARMOR Location 
Table found in managers as the representative state of an ARMOR. Please refer to section 5.2 for more 
details about the ARMOR Location Table.
In order to use the ARMOR Location Table as a basis for verifying the integrity of the armor through data 
signatures, all particpants must have the same consistent view of the data so that the data signatures 
computed by each particpant will match for the same set of data.
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5.2 ARM O R Hierarchy
This section describes the ARMOR hierarchy as it relates to the error detection algorithms. We also 
introduce some of the relationships between the various levels of the ARMOR hierarchy and the pertinent 
information that they keep for the error detection algorithms. ARMOR Parent-Child-Sibling Relationship
The ARMOR hierarchy presented here is according to the manager-subordinate relationship among the 
ARMORS. The hierarchical arrangement of ARMORS in different ranks is shown in Figure 15. The figure 
also shows replicated ARMORS. Note that the replication degree of ARMORS of any rank is unconstrained 
and is determined by the desired reliability level. Also, within the same rank, the replication degree of 
different ARMORS may vary.
Rank 3 (e.g. Execution 
ARMOR)
Rank 2 (e.g. Surrogate 
Manager)
Rank 1 (e.g. FTM)
▲
Figure 15: ARMOR Hierarchy
In the ARMOR hierarchy, a lower rank number denotes a higher ranking manager. Thus, rank 1 consists of 
the highest ranking manager—the FTM and its replicas. The rank of a manager is one less than its 
immediate subordinate.
The ID assigned to an ARMOR is a 3-tuple. The first element of the tuple is the rank of the ARMOR, the 
second element is the ID unique to the logical ARMOR in that rank7, and the third element is the ID unique 
to the particular ARMOR replica within the logical ARMOR. The 3-tuple uniquely identifies all ARMORS in 
the Chameleon environment.
The first ARMOR within a logical ARMOR (i.e., the ARMOR placed first in a round-edged rectangle, or the 
ARMOR whose ID has its third tuple being 1) is the primary and all others are backups (active or passive 
depending upon the particular operation or execution strategy). The ARMORS which constitute a logical 
ARMOR are referred to as siblings of each other. The parent-child relationship among ARMORS is defined 
as follows: In Figure 15, the primary in the logical ARMOR at the source (or head) of an arrow is referred 
to as the parent of all the replicas within the logical ARMOR at the sink (or tail) of the arrow. The child 
relationship is the reverse of the parent relationship. For example, in Fig. 15, A( 1,1,1) is the parent of 
A (2,l,l) and A(2,l,2). A (2,l,l) and A(2,l,2) are siblings, and so are A (l,l,l) , A (l,l,2) and A(l,l,3). 
Note that because of this definition, A (l,l,2) is not a parent of A(2,l,l).
7 A particular ARMOR and its replicas constitue a logical ARMOR. In Fig. 15, all ARMORs within a single round-edged rectangle 
form a logical ARMOR. This is because all of these ARMORs are visible to the outside world as a single ARMOR except for the 
error detection protocols. For error detection, distinction has to be made among those ARMORs so as to diagnose a faulty 
replica.
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Generally,
• Necessary and sufficient condition for A (il,jl,k l) and A(i2,j2,k2) to be siblings is il=i2 and jl=j2.
Necessary (though not sufficient) condition for A (il,jl,k l) to be the parent of A(i2,j2,k2) is i2=il+l, 
k l= l.
5.2.1 ARMOR State
The state maintained at each ARMOR may be quite complicated. It is also dependent on the position of the 
ARMOR in the ARMOR hierarchy. For example, state at the FTM will include a list of functioning hosts 
participating in the Chameleon environment and the respective loads on these hosts. This state 
information need not be present at any other ARMOR. Again, the state at a manager ARMOR will include 
diagnostic information such as the number of failures of a subordinate ARMOR on a particular node so that 
migration to another node may be initiated if it exceeds a certain threshold. This will not be part of the 
state at an ARMOR which is a leaf node in the hierarchy. For the purpose of this discussion, however, we 
will use the ARMOR Location Table as our representative example of ARMOR state.
5.2.2 Superset Relationship in ARMOR State
The state maintained at the ARMORS follows a superset relation according to its placement in the hierarchy 
tree denoted in Figure 15. The parent, along with its siblings, contains a superset of the state maintained at 
its child and its siblings. In the example from Figure 15, the ARMOR Location Table at A( 1,1,1) (the 
primary FTM) will contain location information for all the other ARMORs; the ARMOR Location Table at 
A (2,l,l) will contain location information for A (3,l,l) and A(3,l,2). Applying the transitive relation to 
ARMORS at subsequently lower levels, we can conclude that the state at an ARMOR is the superset of any 
of its subordinate ARMORS (direct or indirect subordinates).
5.2.3 Active or Passive Replicas
The replicas may be configured as active or passive replicas. They may also switch roles at runtime 
depending on failures being encountered (a higher fault rate may necessitate running the replicas as active 
replicas) or on a per-operation basis (a critical operation like terminating an application may have to be 
taken by FTM replicas acting in active mode). The same elements are installed in all ARMOR replicas. 
Based on a flag that is set in the ARMOR, either all the elements containing the normal functionality of the 
ARMOR are activated (active replica), or only the element responsible for maintaining consistent state and 
participating in the error detection protocols is activated (passive replica).
5.2.4 Distribution of ARMOR Signatures within the Hierarchy
The data part of the signature does not have to be explicitly distributed among any of the entities. To 
recall, the data part of the signature is computed on some common data structure (like the ARMOR 
Location Table). By the consistency protocol described in section 6.2, the ARMOR Location Table is made 
the same in all the ARMOR replicas; therefore, we have effectively distributed the data signature among all 
ARMOR replicas. Again, because of the superset relationship for the ARMOR state among ARMORS and 
their children the data signature of an ARMOR is available to all its managers (direct or indirect managers).
In contrast to the data signature, the control signature has to be explicitly loaded into other ARMORs. To 
minimize the overhead of the loading operation, the control signature should be distributed to the minimal 
set of ARMORs. In this section, we present the set of ARMORs to which the control signature has to be 
loaded. A mention is made of when it comes of use in one of the different error detection levels. This will 
be clarified during the detailed discussion of the detection protocols in sections 6.1 - 6.3
The control signature of an ARMOR A  [CSigA] is loaded into:
• The local daemon [DA] (used in Level 2)
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• The set of replicas of A [RA] (used in Levels 3 and 4)
• The set of manager replicas of A [MA] (used in Level 4)
The set of child replicas of A [CA] (used in Level 4)
• The set of daemons on which A has installed children. This is loaded when A installs the subordinate 
ARMORS and is used during Level 4.
In addition, the control signature of the FTM is loaded into all the Daemons in the Chameleon 
environment. This is loaded when a node registers itself with the FTM, and the FTM installs a Daemon 
on that node. This is used in executing Level 4 when the FTM installs a Surrogate Manager and involves 
the Daemon as a participant.
6 Hierarchical Error Detection in a r m o r s
This section describes the hierarchical error detection techniques for ARMORS that are available at each of 
the levels.
6.1 Level 1: Internal a r m o r  Techniques
The Level 1 error detection techniques are built into each ARMOR at design time. The goals are to make 
the ARMOR self-checking and to enable detection techniques external to the ARMOR. This level consists of 
three basic detection techniques currently.
1. Assertion checks. Assertion checks are built into the elements. The assertion check may take one of 
several forms. It may be a check for a type of message the element has not subscribed to, or it may be 
a validation check on some internal data structure of the ARMOR (e.g., check to see that the location 
table size of a manager is not zero). When an assertion check fails, element notifies the local daemon 
of the error. A typical assertion check in an ARMOR element is shown in Figure 16.
Element of ARMOR Aj resident on node with Daemon Dj
switch (IncomingMessaggeType)
case M1:
break;
case M2:
break;
default: // Error. Wrong message type.
Dj. notify ({ej ,Aj});
Figure 16: Assertion check in ARMOR element
2. Livelock detection. Livelock detection can also be done within an ARMOR. Because of the 
multithreaded nature of the ARMOR architecture, an element typically acquires a mutex lock before 
accessing its local data structure. Since must livelock conditions will occur while processing the local 
data structure, a separate thread in the ARMOR can watch the mutex locks to detect livelocks. In our 
current design, we are planning to have a dedicated element (a Monitor Element) that executes this 
dedicated thread to detect livelocks. If a lock is observed to be held for greater than a threshold 
period of time, the Monitor Element notifies the daemon abou the error. A fallout of this design is 
that the Monitor Element has to be informed of the installation or uninstallation of any other element
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(or, at least, those elements willing to have their mutex locks monitored). This is achieved by having 
the Monitor Element subscribe to the M SG_CM P_ADD_ELEM ENT and M S G _C M P _D E L E T E _- 
ELEMENT message. Also, the Monitor Element has to be informed of the lock variable of the other 
elements. An element can provide this information in its e l e m e n t _ t : : i n i t  () function called 
during the initialization of a newly-instantiated element.
3. Signature computation. This enables error detection at other levels. As discussed in section 5.1.1.1, 
the signature gets computed within the ARMOR and is generated in an internal data structure available 
for use by a higher detection level.
6.2 Level 2: Detection by the Local Daemon
Level 2 consists of the error detection done by the local daemon. There are two basic techniques 
available at this level:
The daemon captures the exit status of a child ARMOR process. This relies on the malfunctioning ARMOR 
generating an exception in the underlying operating system, which is captured by the daemon.
The daemon heartbeats each ARMOR that is installed on the local node. If a manager entity needs to be 
updated about the health of a subordinate entity, it may send a request to the daemon to heartbeat the 
specific ARMOR outside of the regular heartbeat period. Thus the heartbeats from the daemon may be 
synchronous (when it follows the specific period) or asynchronous (when it is done pre-emptively by a 
message from a manager entity). In response to these “smart” heartbeats, the ARMOR activates its 
constituent elements to do a consistency check. This it does by activating each of the constituent elements 
with a test message such that the response of the element to the test message is known by the daemon. 
The daemon generates a syndrome information for the ARMOR and concludes if any of the constituent 
elements is faulty and needs to be reinstalled.
Levels 1 and 2 interact to provide errors from propagating outside the node. As discussed in the previous 
section, a Level 1 detection technique may notify the local daemon of an error. In this case, recovery is 
handled by the daemon as if the detection had been done at Level 2. In addition, when an ARMOR wants 
to communicate with another ARMOR, the daemon can check the signature of the sending ARMOR before 
forwarding the message to verify that the source ARMOR is functioning correctly. This provides error 
containment within the local node using the daemon as the barrier.
6.3 Level 3: Detection among ARM O R  Replicas
Level 3 is the first level in which detection does not occur on the local node on which the ARMOR is 
executing. Thus, the mechanisms are this level are not susceptible to malfunctioning of the node. One of 
the mechanisms envisaged at this level involves exchange of signatures among ARMOR replicas. As 
discussed.in section 5.2.4 both control and data signature are available with all the replicas of an ARMOR. 
Hence comparison of the received value and the “golden” value can be done at each of the replicas.
This protocol involves message exchanges among replicas of an ARMOR. The messages contain both the 
control and the data signature of an ARMOR. The protocol executes with a certain periodicity. The trigger 
to activate the protocol is a timer that runs locally on each ARMOR replica. For the data signatures to be 
consistent across replicas, their data must have been made consistent. Hence, this protocol cannot execute 
in between a consistency protocol. Hence, the Level 3 and the Level 4 protocols are atomic with respect 
to each other. This is achieved by using the same element within each ARMOR for both the Level 3 and L 
evel 4 protocol. The element acquires its mutual exclusion lock at the beginning of either of the protocols 
and releases it on termination of the protocol.
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Protocol has periodicity t 
Self.lD = (M,N,P)
Set of replicas = (M,N,x), x=1,...,R  
do {
Set timer = x;
Start timer;
When (timer expires) {
Lock element to ensure protocol atomic w.r.t. state change;
For each ARMOR (M,N,x), x=1..... R, x*P {
Send(SigSelf = CSigSelf + DSigSelf);
}
Unlock element;
}
Set timeout_timer = N * x;
Start timeout_timer;
Wait for Sig(M,N,x), V x=1,...,R , x *P  till timeout_timer expires;
For each ARMOR (M,N,x), x=1..... R, x*P  {
If (Sig(M,N,x) == SIG(M,N,x)) Then 
OKAY!
Else
Notify Manager of (M,N,x) of fault;
}
} while (TRUE);
CSig(x,y,z) & DSig(x,y,z) : Control and Data Signature respectively of ARMOR (x,y,z)
SIG(x,y,z) : Golden signature of ARMOR (x,y,z)
Figure 17: Pseudo-code for the Level 3 Protocol
The Level 3 protocol pseudo code is given in Figure 17. When the timer for the default periodicity of the 
protocol expires, each ARMOR computes its data signature and control signature and sends it to each of its 
replicas. Notice that the actual time between the timer being started and the protocol starting execution 
may be greater than the default periodicity (x in Figure 17) because the attempt to gain the lock for the 
element may fail if the Level 4 protocol is executing. After it is done with sending its signature, it waits to 
receive the signatures from all of its replicas. If no signature is received from a replica, it flags a missing 
value. At time of comparison all missing values and all signatures that don’t compare with the golden 
\ copy are flagged as errors. It is to be noted that the protocol executes in close synchrony among the 
replicas because the timer x is started only after one round of comparisons is completed. Thus the skew 
between two replicas can never become greater than (Timeout for flagging missing value + Skew between 
the times to do comparisons at each replica).
When a manager is notified of an error through this protocol, it checks to see that all of its replicas have 
been notified of the potentially faulty ARMOR. Only then does it initiate recovery. Otherwise, it forwards 
the possible fault to the next level by running the diagnostic phase of the Level 4 protocol. This is because 
if we assume that only a single ARMOR among the ARMOR replicas fails (and sufficiently high coverage 
for a faulty ARMOR being unable to produce a valid signature), then all the replicas other than the faulty 
ARMOR will detect a mismatch in the signature of the faulty ARMOR and execute the symmetric action of 
notifying the manager. Observe that for the common case of an ARMOR having two replicas and one of 
them failing, this protocol will be unable to diagnose the faulty replica and will trigger the Level 4 
protocol.
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6.4 Level 4: Detection Among Adjacent Rank A R M O R s
This is the highest level of error detection in Chameleon. This level incurs the most overhead among the 
four levels, and is also least frequently invoked. Like any of the other levels, the mechanisms at this level 
may be turned on or off depending on the overhead that can be tolerated. The Level 4 error detection 
involves the participation of ARMORS from at least two adjacent ranks in the ARMOR hierarchy. It is 
invoked on state changes in the system or when an error remains undiagnosed at the lower levels. 
ARMOR replication introduces the problem of keeping the replica states consistent. The goal of keeping 
consistent replica state coupled with checking integrity of the replicas is sought to be achieved through 
the Level 4 protocol. The two goals are mapped to two logical phases of the protocol.
6.4.1 Protocol Requirements
The Level 4 protocol (L4) needs to satisfy the following requirements:
The protocol causes the correctly functioning ARMORs which participate in the protocol to agree upon a 
consistent update information.
Assuming that at most one of the participating ARMORs is in error, the protocol is able to diagnose the 
faulty ARMOR.
6.4.2 Protocol Participants
The protocol is modeled as a Byzantine General’s protocol augmented with error detection capabilities. 
The Authenticated Messages variant of the protocol is used. The theoretical results show that to tolerate m 
Byzantine faults, there need to be at least (m+2) participants. (The case of agreement becomes vacuous if 
there are less than 2 correct entities.) Therefore, to tolerate a single fault, there need to be at least 3 
participating ARMORs. Generally, L4 is executed among a parent and its replicas and one of its children 
and its replicas. For example, in Figure 18, A (l,l ,l) , A (l,l,2), A(l,l,3), A (2,l,l), A(2,l,2) could 
participate in one run of the protocol.
ARMOR)
Rank 2 (e.g. Surrogate 
Manager)
Rank 1 (e.g. FTM)
*0.1.1) 1 A(3,1,2) J
i
------------------
A(2,l,l A(2,l,2)
 ^ -J
\
A (l .l . l ) A (l,l,2 ) A (lt1.3)
/
J )  ARMORs participating in same
run of the protocol
ro
C/3
Figure 18: Example of Participating ARMORs in a Level 4 Protocol
However, if 3 ARMORs are not found among 2 adjacent ranks, ARMORs from other ranks will have to 
be involved. This can be solved by involving ARMORs from 3 adjacent ranks (and this is guaranteed to 
provide the minimum number of replicas, i.e., 3). For example, if ARMORs at ranks 1, 2 and 3 are all 
unreplicated, then ARMORs from all 3 ranks participate in one run of the protocol. If an unreplicated 
Execution ARMOR (EA) installs an application and wants to make this state consistent with its manager, 
an unreplicated Surrogate Manager, it will initiate L4 with participants from 3 adjacent ARMOR layers -
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the Execution ARMOR itself, the Surrogate Manager (SM), and the FTM. The authentication mechanism 
in L4 is through the use of signatures -  both control and data. For the data signatures to be meaningful, 
the participants must have some consistent data that they share. When ARMORs from multiple ranks are 
involved, then the subset of state that they share is used for computation of the data signature. For higher 
coverage from the signature, the data signature must be computed on the largest subset of data possible. 
The subset becomes smaller as ARMORs from ranks which are farther apart are involved. Thus, for 
example, as in the case above, if the EA, SM and FTM are involved, the data signature will be computed 
on a small subset of the total data in the FTM, and hence the detection of a FTM malfunction has lesser 
coverage. Therefore, as far as possible, the protocol involves ARMORs from 2 adjacent ranks.
There is a case where it is not possible to involve ARMORs from 3 adjacent ranks. That is when the FTM 
installs a Surrogate Manager. Even if the FTM is replicated in a primary-backup configuration, it does not 
have 3 ARMORs with whom to run L4. In this special case, the protocol is run between the replicas of the 
FTM and the Daemon on the node on which the SM is being installed. This points to a requirement to 
have the FTM signature loaded onto all Daemons in the environment and this is done when a node 
registers itself with the FTM and the FTM installs a Daemon on the node. Obviously, since the Daemons 
do not share the Location Table with other ARMORs, the signature exchange that goes on in this special 
case is only the Control Signature.
6.4.3 Protocol Triggers
The Level 4 protocol is triggered in the following cases:
State change in an ARMOR. The participants on such a trigger are the ARMOR in which the state change 
has occurred, its replicas and its parent and its replicas (all of whom to which the state change must be 
communicated)8. A state change takes place, for example, when the ARMOR installs or uninstalls another 
ARMOR. It is to be noted that the protocol is triggered before the actual state change has occurred. Thus, 
it will be triggered when a particular ARMOR is about to uninstall one of its children. After L4 executes 
and all the participants update their state, the actual uninstallation occurs. Otherwise, a faulty ARMOR 
could go ahead and uninstall another ARMOR and only after that (when L4 is executed) would it be 
known that the ARMOR was faulty to begin with. As opposed to that, in our design, the ARMOR has to 
run L4 first and only if it is certified to be fault-free is it allowed to do the uninstall.
Error propagation. In addition, if a Level 3 error detection mechanism indicates an error, but is unable to 
diagnose the errant ARMOR, then we invoke phase 2 of our Level 4 protocol.
6.4.4 Protocol Phases
The Level 4 protocol has two logical phases. During any particular run, either of the two phases may be 
omitted depending on the invoking condition. In the first phase, the participants exchange state update 
messages in an effort to reach a consistent state. In the second phase, the participants try to determine the 
erroneous entity, if any, among them. This is achieved by examining the messages exchanged in the first 
phase followed by exchange of the signatures among the participants.
6.4.5 Protocol Specification
The Level 4 protocol is specified in the lines of a Byzantine Generals (BG) protocol augmented to do 
error diagnosis. (Note that “phase” and “round” are used in two different senses in this discussion. 
“Phase” is explained in section 6.4.3, “round” refers to a stage of message exchange in a BG protocol.)
A few words about the mapping of the BG protocol for our environment. In a practical use of the 
protocol, it is important to define the abstract state that is exchanged between the participants. For the first
8 In order to avoid the overhead, an optimization is suggested in the section to reduce the number of times the protocol is 
actually triggered in the system.
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logical phase, the state should be the one on which the participants need to come to an agreement (i.e., the 
state that must be maintained consistent across the replicas). In the Chameleon environment, an example 
of this is the ARMOR Location Table. Since this information is propagated up the hierarchy of ARMORS 
and the protocol participants are also ARMORS from two adjacent ARMOR ranks, it is suitable for defining 
the ARMOR Location Table as the state to be exchanged. For the second phase of the Level 4 protocol, the 
requirements are quite different. In this phase, we are trying to diagnose the erroneous ARMOR among the 
participants by looking at the state exchanged among them. Here, the state has to be indicative of the 
health of the entity. In other words, the coverage that if the entity is erroneous, then the state that it will 
transmit will be in error should be as high as possible. The signature of the ARMOR constitutes precisely 
such a state. Since part of the signature is derived from the internal state of the ARMOR, this indicates a 
natural dependency between the two phases (the consensus phase and the error detection phase) of the 
Level 4 protocol—the phase for attaining consensus should precede the signature checking.
As may be familiar to the reader, interactive consistency protocols can use either Oral Messages or 
Signed Messages. Oral Messages denote that there is no authentication of messages coming from an 
entity, while Signed Messages assume that the message from an entity can be authenticated. The 
advantage of using the Signed Messages protocol is a reduction in the number of participants to tolerate a 
certain fixed number of faults. Specifically, for tolerating a single fault, Signed Messages would require 
three participants, while OM would require four. Since we have introduced the concept of signatures, we 
can use them also for the purpose of authenticating the messages. This is attractive in our case because if 
we can restrict the number of participants required, then ARMORs from multiple ranks will not have to 
be involved in a mn of L4. As mentioned in Sec.6.4.2, this has the advantage of giving higher coverage 
for the associated signatures. Since we already have signatures of each participant loaded in the other and 
if we assume high coverage for the signature to be non-forgeable, then these signatures can be used to 
sign messages in the traditional BG protocol. Since the receiving ARMORs store signatures on a per 
logical ARMOR basis, therefore, to differentiate between the replicas of an ARMOR, the ARMOR Id is 
appended to the signature. Hence, we use the Signed Message variant of the BG protocol in our scheme.
Another issue in the mapping of the interactive consistency protocol is to synchronize the stages of the 
protocol. Once the protocol is initiated, each participant can set local timeouts and if no message is 
received within the timeout, it can conclude a missing message. However, all entities’ timeout clocks 
need to be triggered at the start of the first round. This implies that the trigger for the protocol has to be 
reliably communicated to all the participants. To recall, triggers for the Level 4 protocol can be 
installation, uninstallation, or a detected error from another level. Let us say that the protocol is being run 
among two replicas of the FTM (FI & F2) and two replicas of the surrogate manager (SI & S2), and the 
trigger in this case is an installation of an ARMOR by SI. Once it installs the ARMOR, SI acts as the 
transmitter and sends out the first round message to S2, FI and F2. This message is used to flag the start 
of the protocol. If the message is not received at a particular ARMOR before a message from a 
subsequent round is received, then the entity flags the default missing value for the message from S 1 and 
uses the subsequent message to start its timeout clock. So, as long as the transmitter does not remain 
silent to all the other participating ARMORs, the timeout clock can be started. The problem of how to 
deal with the case when S1 does not initiate the protocol at all and unilaterally tries to force a state change 
is discussed in Sec.6.4.6.2.
6.4.6 Protocol Description
We describe the protocol Z for the most common case when the participants belong to two adjacent 
ARMOR ranks. For the two special cases when one ARMOR from each of 3 ARMOR ranks is involved, 
and when the FTM replicas and a Daemon on which SM is to be installed participate, the protocol follows 
the same general structure. The deviations are mentioned in Sec.6.4.6.2.
Participants: A(I, J, 1), A(I, J, 2 ) , . . . ,  A(I, J, M ): Parent; lower rank number ARMOR replicas
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A(I+1, K, 1), A(I+1, K, 2), ... , A(I+1, K, N) : Child; higher rank number ARMOR
replicas
Since the second identifier parameter for the ARMORS is immaterial in our discussion, we abbreviate the 
representation as: A(I,1), and A(I+1,1), and so on.
Assumption: We assume that at most one entity among the participants can fail. This is a weaker 
assumption than only one entity in the whole environment being allowed to fail. Under our assumption, 
more than one entity can fail as long as they are not participating in the same run of the protocol. Later, 
we identify the time window within which this assumption of single ARMOR failure needs to be satisfied.
Trigger Events (TE):
1) ARMOR A(I+1,1) wanting to install or uninstall another ARMOR9.
ARMOR A(I,1) commanding A(I+1,1) to install or uninstall an ARMOR10.
2) An error being detected but not diagnosed among the child ARMOR replicas and flagged to A(I+1,1).
All the trigger events are from the perspective of A(I+1,1) being the initiator of the protocol. TE1 & TE2 
cause phase 1 of the protocol to be executed. Whether it will be followed by phase 2 or not depends on 
whether confidence can be placed on the integrity of the participating ARMORs (perhaps because of the 
diagnostic having been run in the near past). TE3 causes phase 2 of the protocol to be initiated by 
A(I+1,1).
Note that these trigger events are for the case when we are considering ARMOR installation or 
uninstallation as the state change. In the more general case, state change may be more complicated and 
may depend upon the position of the ARMOR in the hierarchy. In the FTM, for example, a change occurs 
when its list of functional nodes in the environment changes. Thus, for the general sense, the trigger 
events for the protocol, in place of TE1-TE4, will be events that cause a change in ARMOR state that needs 
to be propagated up the ARMOR hierarchy.
Protocol Description 
Phase 1
tO : Suppose the ARMORs to be installed or uninstalled are A(I+2,1), ... , A(I+2,P) and the corresponding 
Daemons are D(I+2,1), ... , D(I+2,P) (maybe not all distinct). A(I+1,1) forms a message of the form 
x¥=iM:S:I, where
M is of the form [{A(I+2,1),D(I+2,1)} ,...,{A(I+2,P),D(I+2,P)},F], where F is a Boolean flag that denotes 
if the tuples have to be added to the LT (installation), or deleted from the LT (uninstallation). This is the 
new update to the Location Table that the participants are trying to agree upon. Thus, by a sequence of L4 
protocols, the state can be maintained consistent across replicas of a particular ARMOR and can be 
consistently propagated up the parent chain.
• S is the concatentation of the Control and Data signature of A(I+1,1) with one difference for the data 
signature. Let LTi+i be the Location Table of A(I+1,X) (i.e., any of the ARMORs A(I+1,1), ..., 
A(I+1,N)) before the update and LT’i+i be the Location Table if it were updated with V (if the 
transmitter i.e. A(I+1,1) were faulty, then there is no guarantee that this will happen). Then, instead of
9 Depending on whether the replication scheme is active or passive, A(I+1,1) may take this decision unilaterally, or it may be 
arrived on after voting on decisions of all the child replicas. In either case, it is A(I+1,1) which initiates the rounds of message 
exchange for the protocol.
10 Here also, depending on active or passive replication among the parent replicas, the command may be given unilaterally by 
A(I,1) or after voting on the decisions of all the replicas.
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using LTi+i, A(I+1,1) uses LT’i+i to compute its data signature. The reason for this is discussed after 
the protocol description.
• I is the ARMOR identifier for A(I+1,1)
The message type M:S:I is equivalent to the form of message m:s in the traditional BG protocols with 
Signed Messages, where is the payload and S:Iss is the non-forgeable signature of the participant. It 
may be mentioned that the unique ARMOR identifier I is necessary to form s so that the receiver can 
distinguish between ARMOR replicas for the same logical ARMOR. Remember that receiver ARMORs 
store a single copy of the golden signature for all the replicas of a particular ARMOR.
After forming x¥, A(I+1,1) sends it to each of the other participants, in the child rank as well as the parent 
rank.
tl  : All other participating ARMORs when they receive the message from A(I+1,1) form a message with 
the same payload and append their signature and ID to that of A(I+1,1). Consider A(I,j). It receives 
M:SA(i+lii):IA(i+jj) and forms M ’ = M: SA(j+1j):IA(I+U):SA(ij}:IA(ij) . is formed by concatenation of the control 
signature and the data signature, where the data signature is computed on the following data structure. 
The Location Table of A(I,j) will be a superset of that at any of the child replicas. The Location Table has 
the structure [ARMOR_ID, Daemon_ID, Manager_ID\. A(I,j) forms a subset of its entire LT restricting to 
tuples for which the manager ID is the logical ARMOR A(I+1,X). Using the restrict operator • from 
database, we have LT’i = • MgrjD=A(i+i,x)LTI . A(I,j) appends the received payload M (containing the new 
tuples which may or may not be finally updated in the LT) to LT’ and forms LT’ ’. The data signature is 
computed on LT” .
After forming M’, A(I,j) sends one copy of it each to all the participants, except the transmitter, i.e., 
A(I+1,1).
For a child replica A(I+l,j) [j*l], the steps are same as above except LT’=LT 
Phase 2
t2 : Each ARMOR has M+N-l values with it. If it does not receive a communication from any of the 
other participants within the timeout interval, it assumes the default value from that ARMOR. It filters out 
the malformed values from the received messages. A value is malformed under the following conditions:
• If the message is M:{CS1,DS1}:I1:{CS2,DS2}:I2 and applying the data signature hashing function 
on LTuM  does not generate DS1 or DS2,
• If II or 12 is not a protocol participant
The ARMOR does a vote on the remaining M+N-l values. The decision is used to update the LT of the 
ARMOR: If no decision can be reached, then the transmitter A(I+1,1) is in fault. Phase 2 of the protocol 
is no longer required. The post-phase (Sec.6.4.6.1) of the protocol is initated. Each ARMOR after 
receiving all the messages examines them in order to identify the faulty ARMOR if any.
To recapitulate, three of the assumptions for the signed messages used in the traditional BG protocol 
(which also hold, albeit with a certain coverage, for Z) are:
A. A loyal general’s signature cannot be forged,
B. Any alteration of the contents of his signed messages can be detected.
C. Anyone can verify the authenticity of a general’s signature.
A. is sought to be satisfied by the following mechanisms:
• Each ARMOR receives the signature of other ARMORs in a specific data structure which is 
cleared after specific periods of time thereby making recreating later in time more difficult. The
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period after which the receiving structure is cleared is determined by how long after a diagnostic 
is run can confidence be placed on the integrity of the ARMOR. This is a tunable parameter for 
each logical ARMOR.
• The entries in the Golden Signature Table (GST) that the ARMOR has for checking upon 
receiving a signature is in a different form from the form of the received signature. For example, 
the GST may have a regular expression denoting all valid signatures, while the received signature 
will be one specific instance. While the ARMOR can check if the received signature satisfies the 
regular expression, it is assumed unlikely to generate a valid signature by expanding the regular 
expression.
B. is sought to be achived by having the data signature that is appended in the message not be computed 
only on the existing LT (that does not include the new tuples). Instead, the signature is based on the 
message itself (i.e., the new tuples). Therefore, if a malicious ARMOR changes any part of the 
message from a loyal general, it will also have to appropriately modify that loyal general’s data part 
of the signature which can be assumed to be a sufficiently unlikely event.
C. is achieved because each participant has the golden signature of all other participants, and knows the 
ID of all other participants.
Under these assumptions being satisfied, an ARMOR can detect a faulty ARMOR under the following 
conditions:
• It receives a malformed message as discussed above.
• It receives different values in messages from the same source. Suppose, A(I+1,1) is faulty and it 
sends [{(A1,D1)},UPDATE] to A(I+1,2), [{(A2,D2)},UPDATE] to A(I,1). Then, after A(I+1,1) 
forwards its received message to A(I,1), A(I,1) would have the following two messages (among 
others):
[ {(A 1 ,D 1)} ,UP DATE]: S A(i+i , 1): IA(i+1,1 >
and [{(A2,D2)},UPDATE]:SA(i+ i,i)-IA(i-»-i,i)-SA(i+1,2):IA(i+1,2)
Since both of the messages are well-formed, and because of assumption B above, it concludes that the 
source A(I+1,1) is faulty. It is to be noted that because there is only one faulty ARMOR, a majority of 
the ARMORs will detect and flag the faulty ARMOR even if the faulty ARMOR had manifested its 
fault to only one of them.
• The signatures in the message do not match with the golden signatures at the receiving ARMOR. The 
assumption about signatures is that a faulty ARMOR can never generate a correct signature. Under 
that assumption, for an ARMOR to be diagnosed as faulty, its signature must have mismatch in every 
message and also this will then be raised by all the other ARMORs.
Alternate version o f Phase 2
If the protocol is invoked in response to a flagging of error from a lower level (and not due to a state 
change), then there really is no state update that has to be communicated consistently to all the 
participants. Therefore, there is no need to run the phase 1 of message exchange detailed earlier. Since the 
error detection mechanism described above is dependent upon these rounds of message exchange, it is 
necessary to provide an alternate mechanism for diagnosis if phase 2 has to be invoked in isolation. This 
protocol takes the form of exchange of signature messages among the participants.
t2.1: To start with, each participant reads in its control signature from its Runtime Signature Table and 
computes its data signature from the current copy of its Location Table. It forms its composite signature 
by appending the control and the data signatures. It then sends out a copy to each of the other participants 
in the protocol.
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t2.2 : In the next time step each of the participating ARMORs has M+N-l signatures from each of the 
other ARMORs. (If it does not receive a signature message from any of the other ARMORs, it flags it as 
the missing default value, which is of course different from its Golden Signature.) The ARMOR then 
locally compares each of the received signatures with the golden copy of that ARMOR’S signature. The 
golden copy is obtained by concatenating the golden control signature from the Golden Signature Table, 
and it generates the data signature by performing the hashing function on its entire Location Table (same 
rank replica), or on a subset thereof (a parent rank replica). A mismatch between the golden and the 
received signatures causes the ARMOR to flag an error in the source ARMOR. Note that this assumes 
sufficiently high coverage for the ARMOR signatures such that an incorrect ARMOR cannot generate a 
correct signature even once.
t3 : If no fault is detected, then each ARMOR updates its LT and the initiator generates the permission 
bits to execute the installation or uninstallation.
6.4.6.1 Post Phase of Level 4 Protocol: Recovery
On detection, the following recovery strategy is executed.
• If any of A(I+1,J) (say, specifically A(I+l,jO)) is in error, that will be detected by all A(I,K) (among 
others). Each A(I,K) sends an authenticated message to A(I,1) asking for recovery. A(I,1) then starts 
the recovery by sending the RECOVER message to D(I+l,jO). This message carries with it the 
authenticated RECOVER messages sent by all of A(I,K), K=2,...,M. D(I+l,jO) does a this validation 
check and only if successful initiates recovery of the failed ARMOR A(I+l,jO). This extra round of 
authorizing recovery by all ARMORS at the I level is to prevent a rogue I level primary from initiating 
recovery of a fault-free (I+l)-level ARMOR.
• If any of A(I,J) (say, specifically A(I,jO)) is in error, that will be detected by all A(I+1,K) (among 
others). Each A(I+1,K) sends an authenticated message to A(I,1) asking to initiate recovery of 
A(I,jO), i f j t e l ;  else each sends the recovery message to A(I,2).
• If A(I+1,1) was not the erroneous entity, then the temporary update agreed upon after phase 1 is made 
permanent. This can be looked upon as a two-phase update of the state of the ARMORs, the two phases 
being mapped to the two phases of the protocol described above.
6.4.6.2 Special Cases
1. ARMORs from 3 adjacent ranks are involved. The control signature of an ARMOR is loaded only in 
ARMORs whose ranks differ from its own by not more than 1. Therefore in this case, the control 
signature is not available at all the participants. So, the signatures that are appended to the messages 
for this case are only the data signatures.
2. FTM installs or uninstalls SM. Since the FTM is the highest-ranking manager without any rank of 
ARMORs above it, it cannot run the typical case of protocol Z. However, the goals of consistently 
updating all the FTM replicas and diagnosing any faulty FTM replica must still be satisfied. 
Therefore, the Daemon on the node on which the Surrogate Manager is to be installed is involved in 
the run of the protocol. Since the Daemon does not have a shared LT with the FTM, the only 
signatures appended to the messages are the control signatures. The control signature of the FTM is 
available with all the Daemons, as well as all the Daemons’ signatures are loaded into the FTM. Both 
of this is done when the FTM installs the Daemon on a node after the node has registered with the 
FTM. The payload contains a single tuple (SM,DSm) which is updated on all the FTM replicas.
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6.4.6.3 Daemon Participation
It is the daemon that ultimately handles the installation or uninstallation of an ARMOR on the local node. 
Hence, the daemon has to be involved in the Level 4 protocol. The daemon’s involvement in the protocol 
occurs under the following cases:
1. When the daemon receives a M SG_DAEM ON_INSTALL_ARM OR message from a manager, it also 
receives with it the Golden Signature of the manager. It stores the signature in its Golden Signature 
Table (GST) and adds this information in its Local ARMOR Management table as [ARMOR ID, 
Manager ID, Pointer to the GST entry for the Manager].
2. When a manager sends an M SG_DAEM ON_UNINSTALL_ARM OR message to a daemon, it has to 
furnish proof that it has taken part in Level 4  prior to the operation and that it has the consent of all 
the other replicas of itself for the state change. This proof is in the form of permission bits that get set 
after termination of Level 4. The uninstalling manager sends the permission bits along with its 
M SG_DAEM ON_UNINSTALL_ARM OR message to the daemon. It then clears out the permission bits. 
Actually, the clearing of the bits is not done immediately. If a probabilistic analysis enables us to 
conclude about an ARMOR’S validity for a time T after having passed Level 4  or Level 3, then the 
permission bits are cleared after time T. This takes care of the situation where one ARMOR does not 
initiate Level 4  and unilaterally decides to perform an uninstall. It also sends the signature of itself 
and all its replicas along with the message. These signatures are checked by the daemon with the 
entry in the GST. In case of a mismatch, the daemon does not carry out the uninstallation.
It is to be noted that the daemon can do the checks only at uninstallation time, not at the time of install, 
because at that time it does not have the signature of the installing entity. It can be argued that this may be 
considered tolerable because the worst scenario is installation of some useless ARMORS by a 
malfunctioning manager, while uninstallation is definitely not tolerable.
6.4.7 Optimizations
Even without doing an experimental evaluation, it is quite intuitive that the above protocol will be quite 
costly. The following optimizations are suggested.
1. Probabilistic confidence estimation. Say Level 3 or Level 4 has been run at time to and all 
participating ARMORS have been found to be valid. Now, a trigger event for Level 4 occurs at time q . 
Phase 2 of the protocol need not be run at time ti if enough confidence can be placed on the diagnosis 
at to.
P(ARMOR is okay a t tj I ARMOR w as fou n d okay a t t0) oc l/( tj -  t0)
Such that i f  tj = to, then P = 1. For every ARMOR, there is a confidence threshold (CTh) that can be set 
such that i f
Pcurrent time ^ CTh
Then it can conclude that the other ARMOR is okay at current time. If among the participants of Level 
4 , above condition holds for every ARMOR with respect to each other ARMOR, then phase 2 of the 
protocol is omitted.
2. Phase 2 of iteration 7 of the protocol is run in parallel with phase 1 of iteration 7-7 . This raises the 
problem of race condition in the update of the ARMOR Location Table, as illustrated in Figure 19.
Note that “Update ARMOR Location Table” in phase 1 is the update to the temporary ARMOR Location 
Table, but the signature computation is also done on this temporary ARMOR Location Table. Therefore, in 
the above case the signature will not match even for a correct entity.
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To overcome this problem, we will have to store two LTs and update each alternately. This is similar to 
the principle applied in distributed checkpointing where two checkpoints are maintained and each is 
written to alternately.
Time >
Phase 1, Iteration 1-1 Phase2, Iteration 1-1
|  Compute Signature 
Update LT |_______
Phase 1, Iteration I Phase2, Iteration I
Figure 19: Possible race condition in parallel execution of phases 1 and 2
3. The triggers for the protocol have been mentioned above. We can specify aggregation criteria in 
addition to these trigger events. The aggregation criteria will enable the protocol to be executed only 
when a certain threshold number of events satisfying any of the trigger events occurs. For example, 
rather than executing the protocol on every single ARMOR installation, it is executed when a bunch of 
ARMORS is installed. This is particularly significant because a common scenario in Chameleon is a 
surrogate manager being initialized and installed by the FTM, and the surrogate manager installing a 
group of ARMORS to set up the execution environment. In such a scenario, we would want the 
protocol to be executed once when the initial group of ARMORS have been installed by the surrogate 
manager rather than for every single installation.
4. The signatures are sent out by each of the participants at the beginning of the second phase of the 
protocol. The reason why this has to follow the first phase is to have the ARMOR Location Table s 
updated. However, the transmitter in phase 1 A(I+1,1) can send out its signature piggybacked on the 
messages at time T2 of phase 1, because it need not wait for termination of phase 1 to decide on its 
update. This would not save on the number of rounds of the protocol, but would save M+N-l 
messages.
5. Consider the condition that the participants cannot agree on a common value after the voting at the 
end of phase 1 (in which case in the traditional interactive consistency protocol, they would choose 
the default value). Such a condition is unique to the case where the transmitter of phase 1 A(I+1,1) is 
faulty. Therefore, phase 2 can be avoided altogether and recovery under the case of error in A(I+1,1) 
can be started.
6.5 Interaction Am ong Detection Levels
The four different detection levels that have been presented do not work in isolation, but interact among 
each other to provide a framework for composing resilient ARMORS. To understand their interactions, we 
first consider each of their internal trigger conditions (i.e., trigger is not from another detection level) and 
then, their external trigger conditions. Finally, we give an example with a replicated, single-threaded 
application to show how an error may propagate up the hierarchy, or get trapped at a certain level. But 
first, we consider events in a sample Chameleon configuration and how the different error detection 
protocols are activated with respect to these events.
Figure 20 shows the configuration where there is the FTM in primary-backup, a single Surrogate 
Manager, a single Execution ARMOR overseeing a standalone application running in simplex mode. Let 
us assume that the periodicity of the signature exchange in L3 is x. The timestamps and the associated 
events that occur as part of the normal functioning of the Chameleon environment are presented in
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columns 1 & 2 respectively, while column 3 shows events associated with the detection protocols that are 
triggered by the events in column 2.
Figure 20: Sample Chameleon Configuration
Time-
stamp
Normal
Event
Error Detection Protocol
TO F1,F2 exchange signatures (L3). They will participate in L3 at tO+r, t0+2t, . ..
T1 F I installs 
SM
FI loads Sigpi to DSm
L4 between D Sm> F I , F2. {SM, D Sm) entry added consistently to F I, F2
T2 SM installs
Execution
ARM OR
L4 between SM, F I , F2. {EA, DEA} entry added consistently in SM, F I , F2. 
SM loads SigsM to DEA
T3 Application
starts
executing
L4 between EA, SM, F I , F2. L4 between SM, F I, F2. {App, DEA} entry added 
consistently to EA, SM, F I , F2.
T4 Application 
has abnormal 
termination
EA detects A pplication term inated abnormally. It sends notification to the SM.
T5 Application
restarted
EA restarts Application from  checkpoint.
T6 Application
terminates
normally
EA detects Application term inated normally. Notifies SM with result.
T7 SM  uninstalls 
EA
L4 between SM, F I , F2. {EA, DEA} rem oved consistently from SM, F I , F2. D EA 
checks SigsM and Perm ission Bits.
T8 F I uninstalls 
SM
L4 between D Sm> F I , F2. {SM, D SM} rem oved consistently from F I, F2.
The Level 1 mechanisms are executed whenever the appropriate code in the ARMOR is encountered, 
without having any specific periodicity. For example, in the case of internal assertion checks, whenever 
there is an assertion check built into an element in the ARMOR, Level 1 is taken to be invoked. Some 
general rules for this technique can be postulated. When a particular message type gets delivered to an 
element, it should be because the element subscribed to that message type and the p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  
function of the parent compound forwarded the message appropriately. So, quite logically, an assertion 
check is inserted into the message processing s w i t c h  statement of an element to catch when a message 
not covered by any of the cases is received. When an error is diagnosed because of an assertion check 
failing, the corresponding element notifies the daemon. From this point forward, it is identical to the 
daemon detecting an error as part of Level 2 error detection.
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The Level 2 mechanisms are executed by the local daemon. As we saw in the preceding discussion, this 
may be triggered by a Level 1 method. The daemon also verifies an ARMOR is functioning correctly by 
checking the signature that is generated by the ARMOR within Level 1. This check is performed by the 
daemon when it receives a message from the ARMOR for routing to another ARMOR. Again, in 
response to a smart heartbeat sent by the daemon, diagnostic techniques internal to the ARMOR may be 
triggered.
The Level 3 signature exchange actions also happen with a certain periodicity. This is the only trigger for 
this level currently. When an error is detected by any of the lower levels, the manager of the entity 
diagnosed as faulty is notified for initiating recovery. There is a possibility after Level 3 that an error is 
detected, but not identified to any particular ARMOR. In such a case, the phase 2 of the Level 4  protocol is 
invoked. This serves as the only interaction between Level 3 and Level 4.
Now let us consider a replicated, single-threaded application running on a single node in the system. Let 
us consider the various entities that may fail and could affect successful completion of the application. 
The application may terminate abnormally. The first level of defense against this is the Execution ARMOR 
which directly monitors the application for any illegal signals that are raised by it. If the application 
exhibits a value-domain error, then this would be captured by the Voter ARMOR at the time of voting on 
the results of the application, either intermediate or final voting. The Execution ARMOR may itself fail. 
The first line of defense is the Level 1 error detection. If the monitor thread detects this failure (by 
detecting lack of progress, etc.) then it informs the daemon and the daemon informs the a r m o r ’s 
manager for recovery. If an assertion check put in the ARMOR code captures the error, it again flags it to 
the daemon. If internal techniques fail, the daemon may detect the failure of the ARMOR either because it 
does not respond to the daemon’s heartbeat, or the signature that the ARMOR sends out does not tally with 
the entry in the repository with the daemon. At the next level, if the ARMOR is replicated, it and its 
replicas take part in signature exchange rounds. The ARMOR on its own sends out its signature to all its 
replicas. Also on receiving signatures from its replicas, it does a local comparison and can flag an error. 
Finally, whenever the ARMOR installs (or uninstalls) another ARMOR, it acts as a transmitter for Level 4 
protocol messages and then participates in diagnostic rounds. If at any level, the ARMOR is detected as 
faulty, its functioning is suspended by its manager and recovery initiated. In this manner, the whole suite 
of detection techniques can hierarchically provide a very high coverage for the ARMOR’S fault tolerance. 
Note that when the application is executing, it can execute for periods when the surrogate manager, or 
some other manager is absent (because it is in the process of being recovered). Therefore, the application 
may be oblivious to errors being detected and recovered in some of the ARMORS.
To conclude, we have seen that several errors in an ARMOR may be detected at a level quite close to the 
ARMOR, in which case the higher overhead upper levels do not see the error at all, or the error may bubble 
up to a higher level. Also, a lower level may provide notification to a higher level about any potential 
malfunction in an ARMOR, so that the more powerful higher level may execute a higher assurance 
detection diagnostic. These different error detection levels working in cooperation are expected to provide 
a suitably high coverage for the Chameleon ARMORS.
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7 Availability Analysis of Chameleon
This section describes the availability analysis done on the Chameleon architecture. The analysis 
determines the availability of the system from the application point of view. The analysis was done using 
Markov models for the various entities in Chameleon and getting the availability of each of these entities. 
The analysis was required to prove design objectives. It tests whether the current Chameleon architecture 
satisfies the goals of the design. The presented availability analysis does not take into account the 
multiple error detection strategies that were described earlier in this report.
7.1 An Overview of the Model
To keep the task of constructing the Markov model manageable, we restrict the models as follows:
• Availability is assessed from the perspective of the user application.
• Undetected errors cause the system to restart (possibly with a high latency). An uncovered error refers 
to any error that goes undetected by any entity in the Chameleon environment.
From the time the user makes an execution request to the F IM  to the time he collects the results, the 
Chameleon system goes through various stages. Once the FTM selects and installs the Surrogate 
Manager, the FTM initiates the flow-of-control graphically represented in Figure 21. Figure 21 shows an 
example execution strategy for an application run in TMR.
Much of the time, however, is spent in the “TMR Exec” stage in the above figure. The other states 
simply install s, uninstall ARMORS, send the application code, and send results. While these actions do 
take a finite amount of time, they add little to the overall execution time of the application. The Markov 
model, therefore, concentrates on the time spent in “TMR Exec.” Stage.
When Chameleon enters the TMR Exec stage as described above, the Surrogate Manager has already 
installed the three Execution ARMORS and the Voter ARMOR necessary to realize the required level of fault 
tolerance. The TMR Exec stage, itself, may be decomposed into two phases: the execution phase and 
the voting phase. Of the two, the execution phase is the most complex and will be analyzed in the model.
Install agents Execute app
SendApp and send app and send Send results Send results
*1 —  ?0 +  AtfTMi h — h Attmr h  —  U  +  A  t  F T M  2
Figure 21: Flow-of Control for the TMR execution strategy in Chameleon
7.2 Description of the Model
Two models are developed for Chameleon.
51
1. A model where all failures are recoverable. This means that the availability of the system will be a 
steady state one, and will not degrade with time. This model typically stands for what Chameleon 
hopes to achieve. In an ideal environment, all the errors will be recovered from by using a variety of 
error detection and recovery techniques. The availability of the system will remain the same over a 
wide range of time, making it possible to give availability guarantees when used in long mnning 
missions.
2. A model with unrecoverable failures. This model is similar to the earlier model, except that there is an 
absorption state in the Markov model for each entity. The availability of such a system will decrease 
with time.
The model consists of Markov descriptions of all the entities in Chameleon. The entities include the 
application, Execution ARMOR, Heartbeat ARMOR, Daemon, Surrogate Manager and FTM.
7.2.1 Model with all Failures Recoverable
The a p p l ic a t io n .  Applications are managed by the Execution ARMOR. When an application fails, the 
failure is detected by the Execution ARMOR. The Execution ARMOR is also the one, which does the 
recovery of the application. We have created two descriptions for the application, one for the application 
running in the simplex mode and another for the application running in TMR mode. The description of 
the application executing in simplex mode is shown in Figure 22. The raw failure rate of the application is 
A,app. This is taken to be a constant and is an input to the model. The rate at which detection is done by the 
Execution ARMOR is A.a and is given by the expression:
Where capp is the coverage that an error will be detected by one of the detection levels and Pexec is the 
availability of the Execution ARMOR. The recovery of the application is done by the Execution ARMOR 
with the recovery rate pA
Where jiapp is the application repair rate. Here, repair time, which is the inverse of the repair rate, 
corresponds to the time from detection of failure to the time when the application is ready to run, say from 
the last checkpoint.
In the Markov description, the application is available if it is in the OK state. State A denotes the state of 
application failure, state E denotes the Execution ARMOR failure, H - the host failure, D - Daemon failure,
Figure 22: Model for Application in simplex mode
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and state U denotes an undetected failure. We assume that all failures are recoverable. The failure rate for 
uncovered failures is,
A»u — -^app "t" ^-exec ^-host ^«daemon (  A-a  A g A ^  A p ) •
For the application running in TMR mode, the model is shown (partly) in Figure 23. It is not shown in 
entirety due to lack of space. The model has four stages and each consists of a number of states as 
follows:
1. The OK state, where no failures have occurred.
2. The states A, D, E, H and U correspond to single failures. The system is available if it is in any of 
these states or in the OK state.
3. The states AA, AD, AE, AH, AU, DD, DE..... UH, UU, model states with two failures in different
nodes. As an example, in Figure 23, the states originated from A and state U are shown.
4. The states AAA, AAD....UUH, UUU, model states with three failures in different nodes. As an 
example, in Figure 23, the states originated from AU are shown.
The Execution ARMOR. The Execution ARMOR (which manages the application) is supervised by the 
Surrogate Manager. The Execution ARMOR failure is detected by the Daemon on the same node and the 
recovery is done by the Surrogate Manager. The expressions for the failure and recovery rates of the 
Execution ARMOR are:
Ae =  Aexec *  ^exec *  Pdaemon*
PE = Pexec * PSM.
The description of the Execution ARMOR is similar to the description of the application, with states OK, 
E, D, H and U. Execution ARMOR is available if it is in the OK state. This Markov description is valid for 
any ARMOR, which is managed by the Surrogate Manager.
The Daemon. The Daemon failures are detected by the Heartbeat ARMOR. The Daemon is repaired by the 
FTM. The expressions for the failure and recovery rates are,
Ad  ~  Adaemon *  Cdeamon *  Pheartbeat*
P d  = Pdeamon * P fTM.
The description for the Daemon has the states OK, D, H and U. The Daemon is available if it is in OK 
state.
The Surrogate Manager: The ARMORS lik e  Surrogate Manager and the Heartbeat ARMOR are managed 
by the FTM. Their failures are detected by the local Daemon and their recovery is done by the FTM. The 
expressions for the failure and recovery rates of the Surrogate Manager are,
A-SM =  Asurrogate * C$M *  Pdaemon*
PSM = Psurrogate * PFTM.
The expression for the Heartbeat ARMOR is similar. The description of the Surrogate Manager has the 
states OK, SM, D, H and U. The Surrogate Manager is available if it is in the OK state.
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Figure 23: Model for application in TMR
The FTM: The FTM can operate in several execution modes, e.g., TMR mode on a dedicated machine 
with a single voter or a distributed TMR with one or duplicated voter. Hence, the availability of FTM 
(P ftm) can be easily obtained by solving a Markov model, corresponding to the selected execution mode 
of the FTM. For the analysis purposes, it is assumed that the FTM operates in a primary backup mode. 
The FTM cannot recover if the primary and the backup fail at the same time. Detection of the failure of a 
copy of the FTM is done by the Daemon. Hence, the failure expressions for the FTM are,
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A-FTM — A,ftm *  Cftm *  Pdaemon- 
M-FTM = M'ftm * PFTM.
The description of FTM has the following states OK, Fail_l, Fail_2, D, H and U. Fail_l corresponds to 
the state with one replica failing. Fail_2 corresponds to the state with both replicas failing (it is an 
absorption state).
Finally the host/node failures are detected by the Heartbeat ARMOR and are recovered by the FTM. The 
host recovery is typically done by migrating all ARMORS to a new host/node. The expressions for failure 
and recovery rates are
A-H =  A-host *  Ghost *  Pheartbeat- 
M-h = M-host * P ftm.
7.2.2 Model with Unrecoverable Failures:
The Markov descriptions for the model with unrecoverable failures is the same as those of the model with 
all recoverable failures with addition of an absorption state in each of the descriptions. There is a 
transition from the failure state of an ARMOR (e.g., State A in the case of application) to the absorption 
(fail) state, with rate A^n. This rate is constant and is typically low and causes the availability of the 
system to degrade with increase in time.
7.3 Analysis
An iterative method is used to compute components’ availability. In this method, an initial assumption is 
made about the values of P ftm, Pheartbeat and Pdaemon- With these values, availability of other entities is 
found out. These values are used in the next iteration. A convergence condition is checked to end the 
iterations. The analysis of the models was done with the help of SHARPE, a tool for analytical analysis of 
models. The steps in this iterative method are :
1. Assign initial values to P ftm , Pheartbeat, Pdaemon-
2. C a lcu la te  P sm, Pdaemon, Pheartbeat, Pexec an d  P app in  tha t o rder.
3. With the new availabilities, recalculate P ftm-
4. Check for convergence of Papp. If not converged, go to step 2 for next iteration.
The convergence criterion is that the change in Papp after an iteration should be less than 0.0001.
i.e , I Papp,i - Papp,i+i I < 0.0001.
Where, Papp>i is the value of Papp got after I iterations. The convergence checking was done manually. It 
was found that convergence takes place within 10 iterations.
Using the two models the following analysis was conducted:
• Analysis o f effect o f change in failure rates. We need to know the dependence of the availability of 
the system on the failure rates of different entities. This is required so that we can get an insight into 
how critical an entity is to the system. To do this, we assume default values for the failure rates for 
various entities. Then, a failure rate for one entity is decreased by a factor of 10. In our analysis, we 
kept the default values of failure rates to be 0.1/hr, and decreased each entity’s failure rate to 0.01/hr. 
This is done for all the entities in the system. The availability of the system is computed for each of
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the configurations (as given in section 7.2). The availability was calculated over a period of three 
years. The results are shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25.
• Analysis o f the effect o f the application configuration. The application can run in several modes and it 
is critical to know in which configuration the application should execute to get maximum availability. 
We compared the application running in TMR mode and running in simplex mode. The availability 
was calculated for a period of three years. The input parameters were taken to be the default values. 
The results are shown in Figure 26 and Figure 27.
Parameters used
Parameter DefaultValue
taipp, taxée, ^ heartbeat 0 .1/hr
taaemon,taiost 0.1/hr
XSM 0 .1/hr
À.FTM 0.01/hr
ta ao(unrecovera We ) 0.0001/hr
All coverage factors 0.9
Uappy |Llexec, (iheartbea t 5s ec
U da anon 5s ec
|iSM 5s ec
Uftm 5s ec
M-H 5 min
J™.___________________ 30min
0.976
0.975 - ^ _______________ N_______________ M H _______________ N________________K
A ■■ ■ - -a------------------------------- 6-------------------------------6  —  A- A
0.974 - u  ------  m -----  a - -  . m -------------B --------------- ------- a
0.973 -
0.972 -£*=  0.971 -%I 0 97 "
0.969 - _______________ _ ________________ ________________
0.968 -
0.967 -
0.966 -
0.965 4---------------1-------------- - ------------- - ------------- - -----------------------
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Figure 24: Variation of Availability for the Model with all Recoverable Failures
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Figure 25: Variation of Availability for the Model with all Unrecoverable Failures
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Figure 26: Impact of Application Configuration on the Availability for the Model with all
Recoverable Failures
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Figure 27: Impact of Application Configuration on the Availability for the Model with
Unrecoverable Failures
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The following are the results obtained from the conducted analysis:
• The availability of the application is maximum if the availability of the Daemon and the Execution 
ARM increases (see Figures 24 and 25). The entities affecting the availability of the system in 
decreasing order are Daemon, Execution ARMOR, application, FTM and SM. The Daemon affects the 
most as its failure brings down all the entities in the node. The Execution ARMOR is the one, which is 
closest to the application and is the only one, which communicates with the application. It is also 
responsible for recovery in case of application failures. Hence, decrease in failure rate of Execution 
ARMOR increases the availability of the system to a large extent. To increase the availability of the 
system, it is more efficient to make the Daemon more failure resilient rather than the SM or the FTM. 
In the future,
•  The availability of the application increases more if the failure rate for the Daemon is decreased, than 
if the failure rate for the application itself is decreased. This is a non-intuitive result and points to the 
fact that the Daemon failure can affect several entities, which affects the system availability more 
than the application failure itself.
•  The dependency of application on SM and FTM is not high. This reinforces the design principle that 
the system is able to continue despite failures of managers, and that no one component failure can 
bring down the system entirely. The managers are required only in case of failures of ARMORS (e.g., 
Execution ARMOR), and do not play a major role when the application is running. They are cmcial in 
setting up the system configuration and starting the execution, but do not affect the availability of the 
system heavily from then on.
• Application running in TMR mode has higher availability than application in simplex mode in the 
case of recoverable failures. This is not the case when we consider the model with unrecoverable 
failures. An application running in TMR is supported by more ARMORS and consequently there is a 
higher probability of unrecoverable failures. Hence, the application running in simplex mode has a 
higher availability than application running in TMR mode (see Figure 27). This leads to the 
conclusion that replication not necessarily guarantees increase in the application availability.
In summary, this work shows that the Chameleon architecture satisfies the design principles that the 
system should be able to run despite failures of individual entities, i.e., there is no single point of failure. 
We found that that the Daemon is the most critical component in Chameleon, from the point of view of 
the application availability. This work does not include the multiple levels of error detection mentioned 
earlier in the report. We do not provide insights into the overhead of the error detection mechanisms and 
into the error latencies in the system due to the various error detection mechanisms. The model needs to 
be improved to include non-exponential distributions for error recovery times.
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8 Related Work
Current approaches for providing fault tolerance in a network of unreliable components are based mainly 
on exploiting distributed groups of cooperating processes. Consequently, the primary focus is on 
providing a dedicated software layer to maintain and coordinate reliable communications among groups 
of processes.
ISIS [BIR94] and Horus [BIR96], [REN96], provide tools for programming with process groups. By 
using these tools, a programmer can construct group-based software that provides reliability through 
explicit replication of code and data. Totem attempts to provide high performance and soft real-time 
guarantees to applications, [MOS96]. Transis incorporates multicast services that are capable of 
recovering from network partition failures, [AMI92], [DOL96]. Rampart addresses security aspects of 
group communication by providing tolerance for malicious intrusions, [REI93]. Although reliability may 
be achieved using these approaches, “fault tolerance,” Birman notes [BIR93], “is something of a side 
effect of the replication approach.”
There exist, however, examples of systems, which explicitly address the issue of fault tolerance. SIFT 
was one of the earliest attempts to propose a completely software-based approach to fault tolerance 
through loose synchronization of processors and memory, [WEN72]. Delta-4 sought to define and design 
an open dependable distributed architecture through the use of group communication layers built on top 
of an atomic multicast protocol, [POW94], Piranha, a CORBA-based, [OMG95], extension to Horus 
addresses the issue of service availability in distributed applications by using a highly sophisticated ORB 
that provides failure detection, [MAF97]. AQUA architecture provides a flexible approach to building 
dependable, object-oriented distributed systems while offering a standard CORBA interface to 
applications [CUK98].
“Wolfpack”, Microsoft clustering technology provides clustering extensions to Windows NT for 
improving service availability and system scalability, [MIC97]. At Sun Microsystems work has been done 
on Ultra Enterprise Cluster design to provide highly available data services, [SUN97]. Work at Lucent 
Bell Labs has focused on providing availability of applications through reusable components for 
automatic detection and recovery of failed processes, [HUA93],
Many of the systems presented above requires a specialized and often complex software layer and/or 
additional hardware in order to provide group communication and provide a good coverage for fail-silent 
behavior. Most systems provide an environment through which a programmer may construct a distributed 
application and provide fault tolerance through replication. Chameleon explicitly provides fault tolerance 
through a wide range of error detection and error recovery mechanisms for both applications and 
Chameleon entities. Several of the above systems detect failures solely through the use of timeouts, and 
some do not even mandate that recovery be initiated once failures have been detected. Chameleon tries 
not to make assumptions concerning the fail-stop behavior of any of the entities -  applications or 
ARMORS. Of course, the coverage of our error detection mechanism is the overriding factor in 
determining if such a claim is reasonable.
Many techniques have been proposed to monitor the inter-instruction control flow using signature 
monitoring. The reason for this interest is that it has been shown that control flow errors account for 
between 33% and 77% of all errors [OHL92, MAD92], depending on the fault assumption (e.g., register 
bit-flip or pin-level stuck-at-x) and system characteristics (e.g., RISC or CISC processor), making it 
important to detect this class of errors. In general, signature monitoring involves: (i) monitoring the 
instructions that the processor is executing, and (ii) having access to pre-computed signatures. There are 
two broad classes of techniques with regard to (ii) above - those which store the checking information in a 
separate watchdog memory [EIF84, MIC91], and those which embed the signatures in the application, the 
granularity generally being a single basic block [OHL95]. The Embedded Signature Monitoring [ESM] 
techniques suffer from loss of performance and are unable to handle off-the-shelf applications. The
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former however suffers from high hardware complexity for the watchdog processor. In Chameleon 
environment, we do not have any specialized processor that can act as the watchdog processor. Also we 
are trying to do control flow checking of the ARMORs, which can be modified by the system designers, 
and not the user application. Therefore, the Embedded Signature Monitoring technique is suitable for our 
purposes. Rather than using a unique signature per basic block, the signatures can be inserted into the 
ARMOR code according to the ARMOR designer's judgement. This is meant to reduce the overhead 
associated with generating a signature for every basic block and to free us from the constraint of writing a 
tool to analyze arbitrary code into basic blocks for heterogeneous platforms. Also, with ESM techniques, 
there is generally a watchdog timer which is used to detect the absence of a signature checking point. In 
Chameleon, the equivalent functionality is provided by a Monitor Element internal to the ARMOR 
which does detection for livelock in ARMORs.
The problem of guaranteeing consistent information among multiple replicas is a much-studied problem 
in the design of reliable distributed systems. This was called the "Byzantine Generals Problem" by 
Lamport et al in their seminal paper [LAM82] which introduced a completely unconstrained fault model. 
The solution with signed messages was also proposed in the same paper. It briefly hinted at detection of 
faulty processors through examination of their signatures, but did not expand on this topic. Optimizations 
to the general algorithm were proposed under multiple failure modes in [THA88] where Thambidurai 
and Park proposed an algorithm for Interactive Consistency that retained resilience to the arbitrary fault 
mode, while tolerating more faults of simpler kinds than the standard Byzantine-resilient algorithms. 
The problem of locating the faulty processors in a Byzantine protocol is a less-studied problem. Some 
previous work has been done by Walter [WAL90], Shin and Ramanathan [SHI87], and more recently by 
Ayeb and Farhat [AYE98]. However, the algorithms proposed suffer from one or more of the following 
problems: they are off-line, additional rounds of message exchange are required, or there is no 
deterministic upper bound by when all malicious entities are detected. For our purposes, we have the 
simpifying assumption of a single failure among the participants in one run of the protocol, and we have a 
signature mechanism that imposes certain restrictions on faulty ARMORs (such as a faulty ARMOR 
never being able to generate its correct signature). Using these devices, we propose a simpler algorithm 
for error detection. An illuminating example of application of the Interactive Consistency algorithms in a 
real-world distributed system was provided by GUARDS [POW98], a system currently being developed 
by a consortium of European companies and academic partners.
The issue of replica consistency occurs quite frequently in the literature of reliable distributed systems. 
These works include examination of the concepts of logical time [LAM84], causal ordering in message 
delivery [BIR87] and consensus protocols [CHA96]. Applications for such work have been found in a 
large volume of work on Group Communication. Mention may be made of Rampart [REI96], Totem 
[MOS96] and Horns and Isis [BIR93, BIR96]. Our approach augments the data consistency approach 
with diagnosis performed during the process of consistently distributing data. Also, we incorporate data 
distribution across replica groups whereby a select subset of state is made consistent between replicas of 
different ARMORs.
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Appendix A: Instantiating Element and a r m o r  Objects
This appendix discusses the actions taken whenever a new element object is created. In this context, 
“created” refers to the process of instantiating an element object as part of a compound, not the act of 
designing (and implementing) a new element. Once the instantiation process has been described for 
elements, it can easily be extended to include compounds and ARMORS. Special attention will be given to 
ARMOR instantiation when appropriate.
A.1 Instantiating Within an a r m o r
As mentioned in section 2.1, a single element cannot exist in isolation—it must ultimately be part of a 
top-level a rm o r_ t  object that is capable of sending and receiving messages. After reading section 2.3, it 
should be clear that:
The arm or_t “ layer” contains the necessary functionality to distinguish betw een intra- and inter-ARMOR 
m essages.
• The a rm o r_ t  “layer” relies on an element to forward outgoing messages and to receive incoming 
messages from the local daemon .
Elements, themselves, do not posses these capabilities and rely on the message delivery services of their 
parent compounds to provide them with messages. Because of this, a complete ARMOR is created by 
instantiating an a rm o r_ t object and then populating the a rm o r_ t  object from the top down. All 
elements, therefore, know their parent upon instantiation.
The element_t constructor has the following prototype to reflect these observations:
e l e m e n t _ t : : e l e m e n t _ t  ( e l e m e n t _ i d _ t  i d E l e m e n t ,  c o m p o u n d _ t
* p P a r e n t ,  a r m o r _ t  * p a r m o r ) ;
Note that when creating an element, you must provide the compound to which the element will belong 
and the top-level a rm o r_ t  object (these may be the same object for a single-level hierarchical 
composition as illustrated in Figure 2[a]). Compounds have a similar constructor with the same restriction 
that they must be created as part of an existing compound.
Conceptually, a r m o r _ t  objects are nothing more than a specialized e l e m e n t _ t  object. But because of 
the special role they play (not the least of which involves being the only e l e m e n t _ t  object that can be 
created without a parent), a special constructor exists for ARMORs:
a r m o r _ t :  : a r m o r _ t  ( a r m o r_i d _t  i d A r m o r ,  a r m o r_i d _ t  i d M a n a g e r ,
d a e m o n _ i d _ t  i d D a e m o n ) ;
Having a constructor like this underscores two important facts:
• The ARMOR must have a manager.
• The ARMOR must be associated with a daemon.
The reliance on this special a rm o r_ t  constructor, however, has certain side-effects that we will touch 
upon in the next section
A.2 Element and a r m o r  Factories
Compounds use an element factory to instantiate a specific type of element on demand. Element factories 
have a c r e a t e _ e l e m e n t  () function that takes the same parameters as the e l e m e n t _ t  constructor in 
addition to the type of element to instantiate.
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Because we only support ARMOR instantiation through the special a rm o r_ t  constructor presented above, 
ARMORS cannot be created through element factories—special ARMOR factories exist for this purpose11. 
Segregating ARMOR instantiation from element instantiation implies that elements cannot add entire 
ARMORS to their composition. As a result, you cannot “fuse” two whole ARMORS together under a top- 
level a rm o r _ t  shell. Although not particularly common, such a feature would be nice in a highly- 
composable infrastructure. But this is really less of a limitation than it would first appear, even if you 
desired this rather esoteric feature. Since all of the ARMOR functionality exists in its constituent elements 
and compounds, you can simply add these elements and compounds from the formerly-separate ARMORS 
into a single ARMOR.
While we are on the topic of element and ARMOR factories, it should be noted that we only support static 
factories at this point (the object code for the elements in the factories must be linked into the executable 
that makes use of the factory). In the future, we plan to support dynamic factories that make use of 
dynamic linking (through d l o p e n ( ) and related functions that work with shared libraries under most 
versions of UNIX). With dynamic factories, the executable program does not need to contain any 
elements at all—they can all reside in dynamic libraries that are loaded upon demand. This setup gives the 
ARMOR designer the utmost in flexibility and provides the perfect complement to the reconfigurable 
ARMOR architecture—now, for instance, you could upload new elements during the course of the mission 
and dynamically substitute these elements into executing ARMORS without having to bring those ARMORS 
down. Dynamic factories also help keep the memory usage to a minimum—only those elements that are 
truly being used need to reside in memory.
A.3 Adding Elements to a Compound
All of the composition management functions of a compound are made available through the standard 
message-passing interface. For example, the c o m p o u n d _ t: :p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function handles 
messages such as M SG_ADD_ELEM ENT, M SG_REM OVE_ELEM ENT, M SG _REPLA C E_ELEM EN T, etc. In 
this section, we will look at the steps that a compound takes to add a new element to itself:
Using the element type found in the MSG_ADD_ELEMENT message, the compound uses its element 
factory to instantiate a new element_t object.
• The compound calls the e le m e n t_ t :  : i n i t  () function of the new element, thus invoking the 
initialization routines specific to each element.
We have already seen that each element should override the e l e m e n t _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () in 
order to handle specific types of messages. Similarly, each element should override the 
e le m e n t _ t :  : i n i t ( )  function to perform its own initialization routine. For most elements, this 
simply consists of subscribing to the appropriate messages and of initializing its data structures.
Objects of the a rm o r_ t  class also have their own i n i t  () function. As mentioned in section 3.1.1, the 
c r e a te _ a r m o r  ancillary program calls the i n i t  () function after creating the a rm o r_ t object. It is 
fairly easy to see that the c r e a te _ a r m o r  program is the equivalent of the com pound_t “layer” as far 
as ARMOR instantiation and initialization are concerned.
11 Section 3.1.1 gives a fairly thorough discussion of the role that a r m o r  factories play when a daemon installs a new a r m o r  
process.
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Appendix B: Message Aliasing
This appendix describes a feature that is closely related to the message delivery services of compounds, 
and that plays an important role in integrating element functionality. We will begin reviewing some of 
the key steps in the message delivery process before diving into the message aliasing capabilities of 
compounds.
B.1 A Review of Message Delivery
Recall that compounds keep a subscription list (section 2.2) that they consult whenever they receive an 
incoming message. If an element has subscribed to the incoming message type, then the compound 
forwards the message to the element through the element’s e le m e n t_ t :  :p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e ( )  
function. Most elements implement their e l e m e n t _ t : :p ro c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () virtual function as a 
s w i t c h  statement:
s w i t c h  ( m s g . t y p e )
{
c a s e  MSG__TYPE_A:
/ /  H a n d l e  m e s s a g e  t y p e  A h e r e ,  
b r e a k ;
c a s e  M SG_TYPE_B:
/ /  H a n d l e  m e s s a g e  t y p e  B h e r e ,  
b r e a k ;
}
Note that the programmer must “hard-code” the message type into the e le m e n t_ t :  : p r o c e s s _ -  
m e ssa g e  () function if he wants to use the familiar sw itch-statem ent construct.
B.2 “Connecting” Elements Together
In order to provide the utmost in flexibility, it would be nice to have an element’s services automatically 
invoked in response to some other action taken by the ARMOR. As a concrete example, consider the 
Execution ARMOR that has been configured to attach itself to the user application through a named pipe 
(i.e., the Execution ARMOR that has added the app_np_mgmt_t element to itself [section 3.3.3]). Although 
we did not mention it when discussing the implementation of app_np_mgmt_t, the element subscribes to 
the message MSG_APP_CONNECT_TO_APP message to begin the processing of opening the named 
pipe and establishing a connection with the user application.
Under normal circumstances, this would imply that some other element (be it in the same ARMOR or a 
different ARMOR) would have to send the MSG_APP_CONNECT_TO_APP message to the Execution 
ARMOR to get the ball rolling. Of course, this means that the ARMOR sending the message must 
necessarily know that the Execution ARMOR has been configured to connect to the user application. It 
would be far better to have this functionality automatically invoked if the app_np_m gm t_ t element 
exists in the Execution ARMOR.
The MSG_APP_C01NINECT_T0_APP (hereafter MSG_CONNECT) requires that the application’s process 
ID be provided in the payload area of the message so the app_np_m gm t_ t element knows what named 
pipe to open. By design (not by coincidence), the ap p _ sp aw n _ t element generates a 
MSG_ANNOUNCE_NEW_APP_PROCES S (hereafter MSG_ANNOUNCE) message whenever a new 
application process is registered with the Execution ARMOR. As you may very well guess, the 
MSG_ANNOUNCE message contains the process ID of the application that the ARMOR has just registered.
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Since both the M SG _ ANNOUNCE and M SG_CONNECT have the same payload fields, we should be able 
to have the a p p _ n p _ m g m t _ t  element act upon the MSG_ANNOUNCE message.
Unfortunately, to do this would require that we manually modify the ap p _ n p _ m g m t_ t: : -  
p r o c e s s _ m e s s a g e  () function by adding another case statement for the MSG_ANNOUNCE message. 
Although this involves adding only an extra line into the app_np_m gm t_t source code, we would like 
to do as little tweaking as possible, especially for features that should supposedly espouse the flexible 
nature of the Chameleon architecture.
Herein lies the role of message aliasing (for lack of a better name)—the output of one element can 
become the input message of another element. This, in effect, “connects” the elements together. To 
support this, compounds add another field to their subscription list to contain the alias message type under 
which the message should be delivered to the element.
In our above example, the app_np_mgmt element would subscribe to the MSG_ANNOUNCE message 
under the alias of MSG_CONNECT. Note that this does not involve any changes to the source code, as 
the compound’s subscription services can be invoked through the compound’s message passing interface, 
even by a remote ARMOR (such as the manager of the Execution ARMOR, perhaps). Now, the compound 
will have an entry in its subscription table stating that all MSG_ANNOUNCE messages should be 
delivered to app_np_mgmt_t as if  it were a MSGjCONNECT message. So, during delivery, the 
compound simply overwrites the message type with the alias message type when delivering to the 
app_np_mgmt_t element—a fairly efficient means by which two elements may be connected.
A  sa lie n t p o in t o f  th is  a b ility  re s ts  in  th e  fac t tha t th is  specia l fo rm  o f  su b sc rip tio n  ca n  b e  p e rfo rm ed  b y  
sen d in g  m e ssa g e s  to  th e  co m p o u n d . A lso  y o u  w ill n o te  th a t it  is th e  co m p o u n d  la y e r— n o t the  e lem en t 
w h o  sen d s  th e  m e ssa g e  n o r  th e  e lem en t w h o  u ltim ate ly  rece iv es  th e  m e ssag e— th a t co o rd in a tes  th e  
m e ssa g e  a lia s in g . F ro m  th e  a p p _ s p a w n _ t  e le m e n t’s p e rsp ec tiv e , it h a s  sen t a  MSG_ANNOUNCE 
m e ssa g e  a n d  f ro m  th e  a p p _ n p _ m g m t _ t  e le m e n t’s p e rsp ec tiv e , it h a s  re c e iv e d  a  MSG_CONNECT 
m e ssag e .
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